Product Liability Litigation:  An Issue of Merck and Lawsuits Over Vioxx by Rotthoff, Kurt
Clemson University
TigerPrints
All Dissertations Dissertations
5-2007
Product Liability Litigation: An Issue of Merck and
Lawsuits Over Vioxx
Kurt Rotthoff
Clemson University, krottho@clemson.edu
Follow this and additional works at: https://tigerprints.clemson.edu/all_dissertations
Part of the Economics Commons
This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Dissertations at TigerPrints. It has been accepted for inclusion in All Dissertations by
an authorized administrator of TigerPrints. For more information, please contact kokeefe@clemson.edu.
Recommended Citation
Rotthoff, Kurt, "Product Liability Litigation: An Issue of Merck and Lawsuits Over Vioxx" (2007). All Dissertations. 63.
https://tigerprints.clemson.edu/all_dissertations/63
  
 
 
 
 
 
PRODUCT LIABILITY LITIGATION:  AN ISSUE OF MERCK AND LAWSUITS 
OVER VIOXX 
 
 
A Dissertation 
Presented to  
the Graduate School of 
Clemson University 
 
 
In Partial Fulfillment  
of the Requirements for the Degree 
Doctor of Philosophy 
Applied Economics 
 
 
by 
Kurt W. Rotthoff 
May 2007 
 
 
Michael Maloney, Advisor 
Daniel Benjamin 
Chris Kirby 
Angela Dills 
 
 
   iii 
ABSTRACT 
 
Merck & Co., Inc. pulled Vioxx, a $2.5 billon a year nonsteroidal anti-inflammatory 
drug, off the shelf in September 2004.  The removal followed a study that was published 
reporting Vioxx increased the risk of cardiovascular events after long-term use.  In the 
years since then, many lawsuits have been filed against Merck.  This paper examines the 
incentive to recall a product and the effects of Merck pulling Vioxx from the shelves.  
Using the market’s expected internal rate of return for Merck, I calculate the expected 
profits from future Vioxx sales.  I then use data on financial effects, along with the 
outcomes of cases already heard, to show how the market value of Merck reflects their 
probability of winning legal cases concerning Vioxx. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Merck and Co., Inc. withdrew Vioxx from the market in September 2004 after a study 
was published stating Vioxx increased the risk of cardiovascular events after long-term 
use.1  There were, and still are, many legal cases from Vioxx patients that have been 
affecting Merck since the drug’s removal from the market.  This study uses an event-
study format to find the market effects of the removal of Vioxx from the shelves.  I 
observe that the market reacted completely and immediately to the announcement of 
Merck’s decision, along with all other news announcements concerning Merck.  Because 
the market reacted efficiently to Merck’s decision to remove Vioxx from the market, the 
change in the market value of Merck will reflect the total damages expected to occur.  
This information allows me to analyze the timing of the withdrawal decision of Merck 
and also calculate the probability of Merck winning lawsuits against Vioxx.  To do both 
of those, I will also find the total expected costs of the litigation issues brought against 
them.   
 
The decrease in market value to Merck when they withdrew Vioxx from the market was 
$26.8 billion by the close of the market on September 30, 2004.  This is not just expected 
litigation costs, but rather all costs expected from their decision.  Merck had to pay direct 
costs for the recall, including all shipping and notification fees, along with the litigation 
                                                 
1
 Cardiovascular events are: myocardial infarction (heart attack), unstable angina, cardiac thrombus (blood 
clot), resuscitated cardiac arrest, sudden or unexpected death, ischemic stroke, and transient ischemic 
attacks (transient stroke). 
     
costs.  Furthermore, a large portion of that loss is not due to incurred costs, but the loss of 
expected profits that were imbedded in the stock price.  When Vioxx was  withdrawn, 
Merck still had approximately nine years of patent life left on a drug selling $2.5 billion a 
year.  To estimate the lost profits, I obtain the market’s expected internal rate of return for 
Merck.   
 
With this information, I will determine if the timing of the withdrawal was at a profit-
maximizing time for Merck.  I will also show how the probability of a successful Merck 
lawsuit changes as new information becomes available.  In chapter two, I will look at the 
incentives to withdraw the drug, and what the timing of the withdrawal means.  Chapter 
three will look at what Vioxx is and has a brief timeline of Merck’s history.  Chapter four 
discusses the data and details an event study that shows the effects of the following 
events: 
 
Event One – Merck removes Vioxx from the shelf. 
Event Two –  The Wall Street Journal reports that greater heart risk was known by 
executives.  
Event Three – Merck loses part of their patent rights on Fosamax. 
Event Four –  FDA issues a release supporting Cox-2 inhibitors 
 
In chapter five, I use an analysis of internal rate of return, along with the information 
obtained from the Fosamax patent loss, to estimate the loss in expected profits due do the 
Vioxx withdrawal.  Using these events, I show how they explain the change in 
  3   
probability of Merck winning lawsuits filed against them concerning the drug Vioxx in 
chapter six.  The last chapter concludes and discusses future research possibilities.  
  4   
  5   
CHAPTER TWO 
MERCK’S TIMING 
 
 
Merck withdrew Vioxx in 2004 when sales were $2.5 billion a year—as opposed to the 
$2 billion a year sales in 2000.  In November of 2000, the New England Journal of 
Medicine published an article stating their VIGOR (Vioxx Gastrointestinal Outcomes 
Research) study found no significant increase in cardiovascular events, but problems 
around this article arose.  Merck admitted that the data submitted to the journal to be 
published was correct, but before the study was published, new data arose stating that 
Vioxx did indeed increase the risk of cardiovascular events.  Merck claimed that this 
information was revealed too late in the process to correct the article.  If it was too late to 
re-write the article, there were still two other options available, they could have 
withdrawn the article completely or written a rebuttal in the following issue.
 
  6   
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Figure 2.1 Timing of Withdrawal 
 
In the above charts, NEJM is the date the New England Journal of Medicine published 
results from the VIGOR study, while Withdrawal is the date of the Vioxx withdrawal.  
The top graph shows the yearly sales of Vioxx from the FDA2 approval date (May 1999) 
to the withdrawal date (September 2004).  After that date, the negative number represents 
the loss in brand name capital caused by Merck’s actions.  The bottom chart shows the 
number of cardiovascular events caused by selling Vioxx.  These cardiovascular events 
increase over time, as more people take the drug and longer usage causes increased risk.  
The graph shows no risk up to the point of the NEJM article, because up to that point, no 
                                                 
2
 FDA is the U. S. Food and Drug Administration, more information about the FDA can be found in 
Appendix C. 
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risk was known.  When drug companies perform statistical analyses, there is a lag 
between people taking the drug and when they begin to show side effects.  An example of 
the way in which more information becomes available over time is available in appendix 
A3 that looks at the increased risks of cardiovascular events found from the VIGOR 
study.   
 
Section A (in part 1 of figure 2.1) shows the profits that Merck made from selling Vioxx 
before any knowledge of cardiovascular events (CE) were known.  At the point of the 
NEJM, CE became known, so Merck had the choice to continue to market the drug or 
retract the publication and withdraw the drug at that time.  When Merck found that Vioxx 
caused an increase in CE, there were a number of people already affected by the drug 
(CEi), and the number of events continued to increase until the drug was withdrawn from 
the market (CEw).   
 
To determine why Merck waited to withdraw Vioxx until 2004, I compare the profits 
they received by keeping the drug on the market against the costs of doing so.  To look at 
those numbers, I will compare area B’s present value at the time of the withdrawal to area 
C’s value along with all legal costs incurred, or expected to occur, at the time of the 
withdrawal.  As you can see with part two of figure 2.1, as Merck continues to sell 
Vioxx, the number of cases of CE will continue to increase.  The reason I compare it to 
the NEJM publication is that this is the first instance that Merck found risks of CE, thus if 
Merck would have removed Vioxx at this point, theoretically there would be no loss in 
brand name capital.   
  8   
Because quality of a drug is hard to signal, companies try to signal to consumers the 
quality of their product through investments in brand names.  Klein and Leffler (1981) 
argue that a company’s investment in brand names and trademarks provide implicit 
guarantees to consumers of quality products.  This idea has also been supported by many 
others including Klien, Crawford, and Alchian (1978) and Mitchell and Maloney (1989). 
They all claim that brand names are a quality assurance device.3  The reason for 
establishing brand names is that it is not possible for companies to repeatedly fool their 
consumers about the quality of a product.  Although a consumer could be fooled once, 
they would not be fooled again, and thus the investment in the brand name would be lost.   
 
To find out if, and by how much, Merck benefited by keeping Vioxx on the market until 
2004, I will have to find the present value of sales from Vioxx between the NEJM 
publication and the withdrawal.  I will also have to find the total loss to the company due 
to brand name loss and litigation expenses.  I have the sales of the drug over the years, 
but need to find the interest rate to discount the sales amount and the amount of sales that 
is profits.  These issues will be addressed in chapter five.  I also have to find the amount 
of brand name loss and expected litigation costs.  Although I will not be able to separate 
those two effects out, I can find the markets expected loss when the withdrawal is 
announced.  Chapter four will look at the market’s reaction of the event, and to all other 
events, while chapter five will take out the expected future profits that were expected 
from the sales of Vioxx.
                                                 
3
 Also supported by : Jarrell and Peltzman (1985), Chalk (1986 and 1987), and Benjamin and Mitchell 
(1989) 
     
CHAPTER THREE 
WHAT IS VIOXX? 
 
 
Vioxx (rofecoxib) is a prescription medicine that is a Cox-2 (cyclooxygenase-2) selective 
inhibitor, nonsteroidal anti-inflammatory drug (NSAID).  Vioxx is used to relieve the 
pain and inflammation of osteoarthritis and rheumatoid arthritis in adults.  It is also used 
to manage short-term pain and treat menstrual pain and migraine headaches.  The largest 
competitors to Vioxx are Pfizer’s Celebrex and Bextra (Bextra has also been removed 
from the market) and Schering-Plough’s Remicade, an international competitor.  The 
other alternatives to these Cox-2 selective inhibitors (Vioxx, Bextra, Celebrex and 
Remicade) are nonselective inhibitors, such as naproxen and ibuprofen.4     
 
Nonsteroidal anti-inflammatory drugs (NSAIDs) come as both non-selective and 
selective Cox-2 drugs.  A non-selective inhibitor will inhibit both the Cox-1 and the Cox-
2 enzymes.  Research for these selective drugs began in 1991 when researchers first 
learned of the two different Cox enzymes.  Although both enzymes help produce 
hormones called prostaglandins, Cox-1 is present throughout the body and Cox-2 is made 
only under certain conditions.  The researchers found that only the prostaglandins made 
by Cox-2 enzymes lead to inflammation, pain and fever, while Cox-1 primarily makes 
hormones that help keep the stomach lining intact and the kidneys functioning properly.5  
                                                 
4
 Examples of these are Advil and Motrin (ibuprofen) and Aleve (naproxen).  Note: Tylenol 
(acetaminophen) is not considered a NSAID.  Other Cox-2 selective inhibitors that came later are Merck’s 
Arcoxia and Novartis’ Prexige.  
5
 From “Building a Better Aspirin” Pennisi, Elizabeth 1998 
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In the Research News from Pennisi (1998), John Breitner, an epidemiologist at the John 
Hopkins School of Public Health, said, “the potential long-term adverse consequences
are not known,” although the Cox-2 inhibitors seemed safe.  Breitner notes that because 
the drugs seem so safe, people are likely to use them at higher doses for much longer than 
they would aspirin (because of its known risks).  Non-selective NSAIDs cause an 
increased risk of stomach bleeding, ulcers, and potentially fatal stomach and liver 
damage.  The risks non-selective inhibitors present are only found in a small number of 
people (estimates as low as 2-4 percent of those taking these drugs).  For most 
Americans, ibuprofen or naproxen (non-selective NSAID’s) provides the exact same pain 
relief as Cox-2 inhibitors at a fraction of the cost (naproxen retailed for approximately 
$0.06 per pill prior to its recall while Vioxx sold for as much as $3.00 per pill).6   
 
Vioxx was launched in the United States in 1999 and has been marketed in more than 80 
countries.  In some countries, the product is marketed under the trademark Ceoxx. 
Worldwide sales of Vioxx were $2.5 billion in 2003.  At that time, Vioxx was the third 
largest seller within Merck, following Zocor and Fosamax.  This represented 11 percent 
of the $22.5 billion of total sales for Merck in 2003. 
 
On September 30, 2004, Merck voluntarily withdrew Vioxx from sale.  This came after a 
three-year study (called APPROVe, Adenomatous Polyp Prevention Vioxx) was done on 
the drug, concluding that subjects taking 25 mg of Vioxx had a higher chance of 
cardiovascular events, such as heart attack and stroke, than those taking a placebo.  The 
increased health risks were occurring 18 months after the Vioxx treatment started.  
                                                 
6
 Retail prices from Community Catalyst, where naproxen is a generic while Vioxx still had exclusivity. 
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APPROVe was a multi-center, randomized, placebo-controlled, double-blind study to 
determine the effect of 156 weeks (three years) of treatment with Vioxx on the recurrence 
of neoplastic polyps of the large bowel in patients with a history of colorectal adenoma.7 
The trial enrolled 2,600 patients and compared Vioxx 25 mg to a placebo. The trial began 
enrollment in 2000. 
 
“Merck has always believed that prospective, randomized, controlled clinical trials are 
the best way to evaluate the safety of medicines. APPROVe is precisely this type of 
study—and it has provided us with new data on the cardiovascular profile of Vioxx,” said 
Peter S. Kim, Ph.D., president of Merck Research Laboratories. “While the cause of these 
results is uncertain at this time, they suggest an increased risk of confirmed 
cardiovascular events beginning after 18 months of continuous therapy. While we 
recognize that Vioxx benefited many patients, we believe [the removal of Vioxx from the 
market] is appropriate.”8 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
7
 These neoplastic polyps are the negative effects that non-selective NSAID’s, like naproxen, cause. 
8
 From the “Statement Issued by Dr. Peter S. Kim at the FDA Advisory Committee Meeting” on February 
17, 2005. 
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VIOXX (rofecoxib) is described chemically as 4-[4-(methylsulfonyl)phenyl]-3-phenyl-
2(5H)-furanone. It has the following chemical structure:  
 
 
Figure 3.1 Chemical Makeup  
 
 
Selective Time Line of Merck9 
May 20, 1999  FDA approves Vioxx.  (Closing price of $72.25, which is 
a one-day increase of 2.48%) 
 
Nov. 23, 2000  VIGOR, which was designed to find the side effects of 
Vioxx, such as stomach ulcers and bleeding, is published 
in The New England Journal of Medicine. 
 
Apr. 11, 2002 Merck revises the Vioxx label to include precautions 
about cardiovascular risk cited in the VIGOR trial.10 
                                                 
9
 A detailed timeline can be found in Appendix G. 
10
 The VIGOR study found that of the 4047 patients taking rofecoxib, 111 had cardiovascular events 
(2.7%), while of the 4029 patients taking naproxen 50 had cardiovascular events (1.2%).  This shows 
Vioxx has 2.2 times higher chance of having a cardiovascular event then does naproxen.  This is a RR 
(relative risk) of 2.22 and a RD (risk difference) of 44%, found in Mukherjee, Nissen, Topol (2001). 
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Sept. 30, 2004 – ‘Event One’ Merck voluntarily removes Vioxx from the shelves.  
 
Nov. 1, 2004 – ‘Event Two’  The Wall Street Journal reports that Merck executives 
were worried in the mid-to-late 1990's that Vioxx would 
show greater heart risk than cheaper painkillers. 
 
Jan. 28, 2005 – ‘Event Three’  The US Court of Appeals in Washington rules that the 
company will lose its patent on the osteoporosis drug 
Fosamax by 2008.   
 
Feb 18, 2005 – ‘Event Four’ The FDA releases an announcement saying they believe 
that the Cox-2 inhibitors’ benefits outweigh the increased 
chance of a cardiovascular event caused by the drugs. 
 
Aug. 19, 2005 Merck loses Ernst v Merck case.   
 
Nov. 3, 2005 Merck wins Humeston v Merck case. 
 
Dec. 12, 2005 Mistrial declared in Irvan v Merck. 
 
Feb. 18, 2006 Merck wins Irvan v Merck case.   
 
  14   
Apr. 5, 2006 Merck loses McDarby v Merck case, wins Cona v Merck 
case. 
 
Apr 21, 2006 Merck loses Garza v Merck case. 
 
Jul. 13, 2006 Merck wins Doherty v Merck case. 
 
Aug. 2, 2006 Merck wins Grossberg v Merck case. 
 
Aug 17, 2006 Merck loses Barnett v Merck case,11 and Merck’s 
November win is thrown out.
                                                 
11
 Since this case, the judge ruled that the jury’s verdict stating Merck is liable in the case will stand, but the 
$51 million in compensatory damages were unreasonable. (8/31/06)  
 1    
CHAPTER FOUR 
STUDY SET-UP AND DATA 
 
 
For this study, I use stock market data on the daily returns for fifteen stocks in the drug 
industry and two proxies for the market.  The proxies used are the Value-Weighted Index 
(VWI, value weighted stocks from NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ stock markets) and the 
Standard and Poor’s 500 index (S&P).  The AMEX Pharmaceutical Index (API, ticker 
DRG) includes the following fifteen stocks, which will be the pharmaceutical stocks 
analyzed in this paper. 
 
Table 4.1 – Drugs in the API (AMEX Pharmaceutical Index): 
 
Merck & Co MRK 
Pfizer, Inc PFE 
Johnson & Johnson JNJ 
GlaxoSmithKline plc Adr GSK 
Sanofi-Aventis Ads SNY 
Amgen Inc AMGN 
AstraZeneca Ads AZN 
Abbott Laboratories ABT 
Wyeth WYE 
Lilly (eli) LLY 
Bristol-Myers Squibb BMY 
Schering-Plough SGP 
Teva Pharm Indus Adr TEVA 
Forest Labs FRX 
King Pharmaceuticals KG 
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The data is the daily close prices from the CRSP dataset (the Center for Research in 
Security Prices), up until December 31, 2005, and uses daily holding period returns.  In 
2006, Merck was the seventh largest company by market capitalization in the API, but 
before the withdrawal, Merck was fifth largest in the API and the second largest in terms 
of drug sales.  I use this data to find not only the movement of the stock prices, but the 
movement of the stock prices relative to the rest of the market.  I use the indices, VWI 
and S&P, as a proxy for the market.    
 
Event Study 
 
Following event-study methodology, I use a zero-one dummy variable to see if there is 
evidence of abnormal stock movements during an event.   
R t = α + β R m t + γ D t + ε t 
I will be looking at the daily returns to stock prices relative to the market such that R t is 
the return to Merck—or any given company—at time t, and R m t is the market’s return at 
the same date.  D t is a dummy variable that will take the value of one during the event 
window and zero the rest of the time.  This methodology will directly test for any market 
effects to Merck, or any of the other companies, during the events in this study.  Any 
significant effect on the term γ shows an abnormal return during that event window.  
Because the γ will be showing the abnormal returns, I will only report the coefficient and 
t-statistic on these, and not the α and β which only show Merck’s average movement with 
the rest of the market. 
 
  17   
The null hypothesis on the γ is that the stock has no abnormal return over that period.  If γ 
is statistically different from 0, then the market had a reaction to the event, whereas if γ is 
not statistically different from 0, the event had no effect on that stock’s price.  To 
determine whether all information is captured the day of the event, or is an effect over a 
multiple-day period, I use event-study windows both including the event and excluding 
the event.  This is informative because if γ is significant when the event date is included, 
but not significant when the event day is excluded, it symbolizes that full information 
was captured the day of the event.   
 
To set this up, I first use a three-day event study.  This means that there will be a zero for 
all dummies, except the three days in question.12  The three-day study is done four times 
for each event.  Two of the three-day event studies will include the day of the event, 
while the other two will not.  I will check the reaction of the stock relative to the market 
both before and after the event, each with the event date and without the event date.  The 
four event-study setups are shown below. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
12
 The amount of days in the dummy variable seem to be arbitrary (also noted in Mitchell and Maloney 
1989) as I get the same results when I follow the same methodology using five, seven, or ten day dummies 
as a robustness check. 
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Table 4.2 -- Event-study format for three-day event studies:13 
 
Date 
2
0 
2
1 
2
2 
2
3 
2
4 
2
5 
2
6 
2
7 
2
8 
2
9 
3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1
0 
September     October 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Mrkone (Merck event one, three-day dummy including day of event) 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Mrkonewoday (Merck event one, three-day dummy without day of event) 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Mrkonebef (Merck event one, three-day dummy before the event including event 
date) 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Mrkonebefwoday (Merck event one, three-day dummy before the event without 
event date) 
 
 
After doing the three-day event study, I also repeat the same process for one and three 
months before and after the event (none of these studies will include the day of the 
event).  The months after the event will reveal if the company is correcting itself from an 
“overreaction,” whereas the months before the event will show if any information was 
acted upon before the announcement was public.  I look at these month-long studies with 
caution, as events in this study tend to occur close in dates causing these longer studies to 
overlap.  I do this for all fifteen stocks, each regressed against both indices using data for 
one year before and after the event. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
13
 These event studies include data from one year before, to one year after the event.  This table is shrunk 
down to ten days before and ten days after for demonstration purposes only. 
  19   
Event One 
 
Merck announced that it would remove Vioxx from the shelf September 30, 2004.  The 
announcement was done after the markets closed September 29, 2004.  The first event in 
this study looks at the effects of Merck’s removal of Vioxx from the shelves.  To do this, 
I look at the change from the close of the market on September 29, 2004 (before the 
announcement) to the close of the market on September 30, 2004.  I look at the close 
because although a lot of information was revealed in the opening price (the opening 
price on September 30 was $33.40) on September 30, the change in price to the close that 
day allows investors to react to all information about the removal.  The price of Merck’s 
stock over two years, as well as the daily close percentage change, can be found in the 
appendix B. 
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Table 4.3 -- Event One, the change in price the day Merck removed Vioxx from the 
shelves, Sept 29, 2004 close to Sept 30, 2004 close. 
 
Market Ticker 
Close 
(9/29/04) 
Close 
(9/30/04) 
Percent 
Change 
Merck & Co 45.07 33.00 -26.80% 
Pfizer, Inc 30.18 30.60 1.40% 
Johnson & Johnson 57.03 56.33 -1.20% 
GlaxoSmithKline plc Adr 43.84 43.73 -0.30% 
Sanofi-Aventis Ads 36.50 36.61 0.30% 
Amgen Inc* 57.99 56.81 -2.00% 
AstraZeneca Ads 41.27 41.13 -0.30% 
Abbott Laboratories 42.31 42.36 0.10% 
Wyeth 37.72 37.40 -0.80% 
Lilly (eli) 61.85 60.05 -2.90% 
Bristol-Myers Squibb* 23.86 23.67 -0.80% 
Schering-Plough 18.50 19.06 3.00% 
Teva Pharm Indus Adr* 26.48 25.95 -2.00% 
Forest Labs 44.86 44.96 0.20% 
King Pharmaceuticals 12.14 11.94 -1.60% 
* - There was a change in shares outstanding during these days (the shares used 
are from the later date) 
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Table 4.4 -- Event One, the change in market capitalization the day Merck removed 
Vioxx from the shelves, Sept 29, 2004 close to Sept 30, 2004 close. 
 
  
Market Ticker 
Shares 
Outstanding 
In Billions 
Market 
Cap 
(9/29/04) 
Market 
Cap 
(9/30/04) 
Gain (loss) September 
30, 2004 
in Billions of Dollars 
Merck & Co 2.22 100 73.22 -26.78 
Pfizer, Inc 7.55 227.88 231.05 3.17 
Johnson & Johnson 2.97 169.27 167.19 -2.08 
GlaxoSmithKline plc 
Adr 2.91** 127.57 127.25 -0.32 
Sanofi-Aventis Ads 2.71** 98.92 99.21 0.3 
Amgen Inc* 1.27 73.65 72.15 -1.5 
AstraZeneca Ads 1.61** 66.44 66.22 -0.23 
Abbott Laboratories 1.56 66.05 66.13 0.08 
Wyeth 1.33 50.31 49.88 -0.43 
Lilly (eli) 1.13 69.93 67.89 -2.04 
Bristol-Myers 
Squibb* 1.95 46.41 46.04 -0.37 
Schering-Plough 1.47 27.24 28.06 0.82 
Teva Pharm Indus 
Adr* 0.45 11.91 11.67 -0.24 
Forest Labs 0.37 16.61 16.65 0.04 
King 
Pharmaceuticals 0.24 2.93 2.88 -0.05 
 
    Sum: -29.61 
* - There was a change in shares outstanding during these days (the shares used are 
from the later date) 
** - These stocks are held internationally as ADR,14 the number used is the shares 
outstanding listed by Yahoo Finance 
 
 
Visible from the one-day price changes, the large drop in Merck brought only a small 
increase in Pfizer and small losses in Johnson & Johnson, Lilly, and Amgen.  The largest 
competitors to Vioxx are Pfizer’s Bextra and Celebrex, Schering-Plough’s Remicade, and 
nonselective inhibitors, such as naproxen and ibuprofen.  The profits Vioxx previously 
                                                 
14
 More information about the ADR can be found in Appendix D. 
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benefited from are now expected to become profits to the competition.  This will occur 
only if the market believes this is an issue with the Vioxx drug and not all Cox-2 
selective inhibitors.  If this increased chance of cardiovascular events is thought to be 
caused by all Cox-2 drugs, then the market will worry that Pfizer and Schering-Plough 
will also be battling lawsuits in the near future.  Evidence later reveled that this is an 
issue as all Cox-2 selective drugs are dealing with similar lawsuits and have had to 
change their labels to include warnings of heart risk.  Because of an increased risk of 
cardiovascular events in all Cox-2 selective inhibitors, the increase in price for Pfizer and 
Schering-Plough may not be a significant change from the market that day. 
 
The number of shares outstanding multiplied by the price change will make known the 
change in the market capitalization within each company.  At the time, Merck had 2.2 
billion shares outstanding, meaning that the $12.07 overnight loss to the stock price 
represents a market value loss to Merck of $26.8 billion.  That same day, Pfizer had an 
increase of $3.2 billion and Schering-Plough had an increase of $0.8 billion, while 
Johnson & Johnson lost $2.1 billion, Lilly lost $2 billion, and Amgen lost $1.5 billion.  
The net loss to these fifteen stocks that day was $29.6 billion (the overnight loss was $16 
billion).  This loss represents the total expected loss due to Merck’s decision to remove 
Vioxx from the shelves.  The loss to Merck was $26.8 billion, while the difference 
between Merck’s loss and the total drug industry loss was $0.8 billion.  So at first 
thought, the $0.8 billion difference would capture the expected loss to the industry from 
the effects of the Cox-2 inhibitors.  But before we explore that idea, let’s first see if 
indeed the market captured all information that day.   
  23   
Table 4.5 – Event One, three-day study including event day and without event day:  
September 30, 2004 
 
Mrkone Mrkonewoday 
(Event One With Day) (Event One Without Day) Company 
 VWI S&P VWI S&P 
Merck & Co -0.081 -0.081 0.002 0.001 
  (7.71)** (7.76)** (0.16) (0.13) 
Pfizer, Inc 0.007 0.007 0.003 0.003 
  (1.04) (1.04) (0.43) (0.37) 
Johnson & Johnson -0.002 -0.002 0.003 0.003 
  (0.44) (0.49) (0.71) (0.64) 
-0.007 -0.007 -0.004 -0.004 GlaxoSmithKline plc 
Adr (1.17) (1.15) (0.63) (0.65) 
Sanofi-Aventis Ads -0.002 -0.002 0.001 0.001 
  (0.22) (0.19) (0.11) (0.11) 
Amgen Inc -0.009 -0.009 -0.002 -0.002 
  (1.12) (1.11) (0.26) (0.3) 
AstraZeneca Ads -0.008 -0.008 -0.008 -0.008 
  (1.02) (1.01) (1.02) (1.04) 
Abbott Laboratories -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 
  (0.86) (0.87) (0.76) (0.81) 
Wyeth 0.003 0.003 0.005 0.004 
  (0.42) (0.42) (0.61) (0.57) 
Lilly (eli) -0.007 -0.007 0.006 0.006 
  (0.89) (0.9) (0.83) (0.79) 
0.002 0.002 0.003 0.002 Bristol-Myers Squibb 
 (0.38) (0.4) (0.47) (0.43) 
Schering-Plough -0.006 -0.006 -0.015 -0.015 
  (0.71) (0.71) (1.87) (1.93) 
-0.006 -0.006 -0.009 -0.009 Teva Pharm Indus Adr 
 (0.71) (0.67) (1.03) (1.03) 
Forest Labs 0.003 0.003 0.012 0.012 
  (0.29) (0.3) (1.05) (1.04) 
0.01 0.01 0.015 0.014 King Pharmaceuticals 
 (0.63) (0.63) (0.96) (0.95) 
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%, Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses 
 
  
Although Pfizer and Schering-Plough are the two largest competitors, neither of their 
coefficients are significant when the event date is included (nor are any companies other 
then Merck).  This shows that their movement is not abnormal from the market 
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movements; therefore, their gains that day were not necessarily due to the Vioxx 
announcement.  There are two contradictory pressures on the prices of Vioxx’s 
competitors.  One is that they will increase sales making up for Vioxx’s lost sales, while 
the other is the chance that all Cox-2 inhibitors could increase cardiovascular events.  
Because of this, the price changes expected to Pfizer and Shering-Plough are ambiguous.   
 
I use the two initial regressions discussed earlier: first, the three-day dummy including 
the day of the event (mrkone - Merck’s event one), and then the three-day dummy not 
including the day of the event (mrkonewoday - Merck’s event one without the event day).   
As you can see from the regressions above, Merck is significant when the event day is 
included, but not significant when the event day is not included.  Merck is also the only 
company that moves statistically different from the market.  This shows that all 
information was included the day of the event and that Merck is the only company that 
was significantly affected by the event.  The same thing is found when looking at the 
three days leading up to the event.  To do that, I use the same three-day event study 
looking at the days leading up to the event, which is found in the appendix along with one 
and three months before and after the event (appendix B tables B1-3, B1-4 and B1-5).  
This reveals two pieces of information, that the day of the event captured all information 
and also that there is no evidence of insider trading.   
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Other Events 
 
The same event-study format is used for all four of the events in this study.  As the first 
event was fully captured the day of the event, the same was found with the other three 
events as well.  The second event occurred while the markets were closed, while the other 
events all occurred while the market was open.  I will compare the one-day price change 
to see what effect that event had on Merck’s market capitalization.  I will also look at the 
market capitalization change for events that occur beyond the dates of the four events in 
the study; however, these events use data from Yahoo Finance as CRSP is updated yearly 
and only has data through December 31, 2005.15  The events in this study include 
information announcements, but in addition, I will also look at the price changes along 
with the market capitalization changes for all legal cases heard up to this point. 
 
The second event was when the Wall Street Journal published an article claiming that 
Merck executives had knowledge of the increased risk of cardiovascular events well 
before they withdrew the drug.  This event was expected to have a negative effect on 
Merck because it revealed information that could cause the market to believe that they 
would lose more lawsuits, so this drop in market value will fully reflect a decrease in the 
probability of Merck winning cases.  This event caused Merck’s stock price to decrease 
by 9.7 percent. 
 
The third event had no direct effects on the lawsuits filed against Vioxx.  This event was 
when Merck lost the last ten years of patent life of Fosamax, their second-largest-selling 
                                                 
15
 The data using CRSP was also done using Yahoo Finance and they revealed the same information. 
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drug.  Teva Pharmaceuticals challenged Merck for patent infringement, and the US Court 
of Appeals voted that Merck did infringe on the patent.  Because of this patent 
infringement, Merck will lose the rights for an exclusive patent to Fosamax in February 
2008, when it was initially set to expire in February 2018.  This will not have an effect on 
the probability of Merck winning cases concerning Vioxx, but will be used as a proxy to 
estimate the profit loss from Vioxx’s expected sales.  
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Table 4.6 – First three events, the stock price change when the event occurs (the other 
cases are found in the appendix B table B2-1): 
 
  
Withdraw of 
Vioxx 
The Wall 
Street Jorunal 
Report 
US Court of 
Appeals 
ruling 
Event # One Two Three 
Date  9/29/2004 10/29/2004 1/27/2005 
  9/30/2004 11/1/2004 1/28/2005 
Company %∆ %∆ %∆ 
Merck & Co -26.80% -9.70% -10.10% 
Pfizer, Inc 1.40% -0.50% -1.30% 
Johnson & Johnson -1.20% 0.10% 0.60% 
GlaxoSmithKline plc Adr -0.30% 1.70% -0.50% 
Sanofi-Aventis Ads 0.30% 0.10% -0.10% 
Amgen Inc -2.00% -2.00% -0.50% 
AstraZeneca Ads -0.30% 0.00% 1.10% 
Abbott Laboratories 0.10% 0.30% -0.40% 
Wyeth -0.80% 0.50% 0.70% 
Lilly (eli) -2.90% 0.40% -3.60% 
Bristol-Myers Squibb -0.80% -0.30% -2.60% 
Schering-Plough 3.00% -2.70% -0.70% 
Teva Pharm Indus Adr -2.00% -3.30% 2.20% 
Forest Labs 0.20% -1.10% -1.90% 
King Pharmaceuticals -1.60% -2.80% 0.80% 
 
 
 
The last event (event four) was on February 18, 2005 when a FDA panel voted to allow 
sales of Cox-2 inhibitors, despite their increased risk of cardiovascular events. This panel 
voted in favor of Celebrex (31-1), Bextra (17-13), and Vioxx (17-15).  This, the fourth 
event, will have a direct effect on the market’s expectations of Merck’s ability to win 
lawsuits as they will now be expected to win more cases since the FDA supports the sale 
of their drug.  Merck increased 13 percent during the day of this announcement.   
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Table 4.7 – Fourth event and the first two court battles, the stock price change when the 
event occurs (the other cases are found in the appendix B table B2-2): 
 
  
FDA 
announces 
support for 
Cox-2 
inhibitors 
Merck loses 
case on Aug. 
19, 2005 
Merck wins 
case Nov. 3, 
2005 
Event # Four     
Date  2/17/2005 8/18/2005 11/2/2005 
  2/18/2005 8/19/2005 11/3/2005 
Company %∆ %∆ %∆ 
Merck & Co 13.00% -7.70% 3.80% 
Pfizer, Inc 6.90% -1.30% 1.30% 
Johnson & Johnson 0.10% -1.10% -0.20% 
GlaxoSmithKline plc Adr 0.90% -0.20% 0.90% 
Sanofi-Aventis Ads 2.50% 2.00% 0.40% 
Amgen Inc -0.60% 0.10% 4.90% 
AstraZeneca Ads 1.70% -1.20% 0.70% 
Abbott Laboratories -0.30% -0.40% 0.40% 
Wyeth 1.40% -0.50% 1.40% 
Lilly (eli) -1.00% 0.10% 0.50% 
Bristol-Myers Squibb 1.80% -0.80% 0.70% 
Schering-Plough 1.10% -0.90% 0.10% 
Teva Pharm Indus Adr 1.80% -0.30% 1.50% 
Forest Labs 1.50% 1.40% 0.70% 
King Pharmaceuticals 1.70% -0.70% 0.20% 
 
 
Other events that are not analyzed under the event-study format, but are still relevant, are 
the first two cases heard against Merck.  Merck lost the first case on August 19, 2005, but 
won their case on November 3, 2005 (later overturned).  When Merck lost their first case, 
the court ruled that Merck had to pay a substantial amount of money.  This signals to the 
market Merck’s total cost of all cases to be heard causing the market to believe the total 
  29   
cost of cases will increase. This results in a decrease of $5.1 billion in market 
capitalization.  Merck’s winning case in November (later overturned) was the first 
example that Merck could win a case and increased the market capitalization of Merck by 
$2.3 billion.  The changes in market capitalization of all stocks during these events are 
shown below. 
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Table 4.8 -- The first three events, market capitalization change during event (all cases 
that have been decided by August 17, 2006 are included in the appendix B as table B3-1) 
 
Withdraw 
of Vioxx 
The Wall 
Street 
Jorunal 
Report 
US Court 
of 
Appeals 
ruling 
9/29/2004 10/29/2004 1/28/2005 
One-day change in Market 
Capitalization 
(Billions of Dollars) 
  
Company 
  
Shares 
Outstanding 
In Billions 
  
  9/30/2004 11/1/2004 1/28/2005 
Merck & Co 2.19 -26.78 -6.72 -7.01 
Pfizer, Inc 7.36 3.17 -1.13 -2.49 
Johnson & Johnson 2.98 -2.08 0.18 1.19 
GlaxoSmithKline plc Adr 2.91 -0.32 2.04 -0.7 
Sanofi-Aventis Ads 2.71 0.3 0.05 -0.14 
Amgen Inc 1.23 -1.5 -1.44 -0.35 
AstraZeneca Ads 1.61 -0.23 -0.03 0.64 
Abbott Laboratories 1.54 0.08 0.17 -0.3 
Wyeth 1.34 -0.43 0.27 0.41 
Lilly (eli) 1.14 -2.04 0.27 -2.25 
Bristol-Myers Squibb 1.96 -0.37 -0.14 -1.23 
Schering-Plough 1.48 0.82 -0.71 -0.19 
Teva Pharm Indus Adr 0.62 -0.24 -0.38 0.27 
Forest Labs 0.33 0.04 -0.19 -0.29 
King Pharmaceuticals 0.24 -0.05 -0.07 0.02 
          
Sum:   -29.61 -7.83 -12.4 
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Table 4.9 – Fourth event and the first two cases, market capitalization change during 
event (all cases that have been decided by August 17, 2006 are included in the appendix 
B as table B3-2) 
 
FDA 
announces 
support 
for Cox-2 
inhibitors 
Merck 
loses case 
on Aug. 
19, 2005 
Merck 
wins case 
Nov. 3, 
2005 
2/18/2005 8/19/2005 11/2/2005 
One-day change in Market 
Capitalization 
(Billions of Dollars) 
  
Company 
  
Shares 
Outstanding 
In Billions 
  
  2/18/2005 8/19/2005 11/3/2005 
Merck & Co 2.19 8.34 -5.14 2.34 
Pfizer, Inc 7.36 13.1 -2.43 1.99 
Johnson & Johnson 2.98 0.24 -2.02 -0.3 
GlaxoSmithKline plc Adr 2.91 1.25 -0.23 1.37 
Sanofi-Aventis Ads 2.71 2.52 2.28 0.38 
Amgen Inc 1.23 -0.44 0.11 4.45 
AstraZeneca Ads 1.61 1.05 -0.92 0.53 
Abbott Laboratories 1.54 -0.25 -0.29 0.23 
Wyeth 1.34 0.76 -0.28 0.85 
Lilly (eli) 1.14 -0.6 0.06 0.3 
Bristol-Myers Squibb 1.96 0.86 -0.39 0.29 
Schering-Plough 1.48 0.31 -0.28 0.03 
Teva Pharm Indus Adr 0.62 0.22 -0.06 0.37 
Forest Labs 0.33 0.24 0.19 0.09 
King Pharmaceuticals 0.24 0.04 -0.02 0.01 
          
Sum:   27.63 -9.44 12.92 
 
 
 
The second event increased Merck’s aggregate amount lost to $33.5 billion, while the 
FDA panel vote decreased the total amount back to $25.2 billion.  When Merck lost their 
case in Texas, the total amount increased again, this time to $30.3 billion, and Merck’s 
victory decreased the aggregate loss to $28 billion.  Because event three did not have a 
direct effect on the Vioxx lawsuits, the $7 billion lost that day was not seen as part of the 
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aggregate loss, but rather a reflection of the present discounted value of a Merck Patent 
loss of ten years.  
 
All of the events in the event study show that Merck moves significantly when the event 
is included, but insignificantly when the event is not included.  The coefficients on the 
dummy variables for events two through four can be found in appendix B as tables B2 
through B4. 
 
Merck lost $7 billion when the patent life on Fosamax was decreased, which represents 
the loss in expected profits by Merck over the additional ten years of expected patent 
protection.  The drug industry lost a total of $12.4 billion, thus the remaining $5.4 billion 
loss that day represents the fears that other companies could also face these same patent 
issues on their profit-making drugs. 
 
On August 19, 2005, plaintiff Carol Ernst won her lawsuit in the Texas Superior Court in 
Angleton, Texas (30 miles from Houston).  Her lawsuit blamed Vioxx for the 2001 death 
of her husband, Robert Ernst, a 59-year-old marathon runner and Wal-Mart worker who 
was taking the arthritis painkiller at the time of his death.  Mr. Ernst died of a heart 
attack, and the verdict held Merck liable for the death.  Jurors voted 10-2 in favor of 
Ernst.  The jury awarded more than $250 million in total damages: $24 million for mental 
anguish and loss of companionship and $229 million in punitive damages; although, 
Texas state law limits the amount of punitive damages to two million dollars when and if 
the case is upheld through the appeals process.  Ernst's Houston-based lawyer, Mark 
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Lanier, said the punitive-damages figure was based on "the money Merck made and 
saved by putting off their product label changes." 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
PATENT LOSS 
 
 
When Merck withdrew Vioxx from the market in 2004, it was selling $2.5 billion a year 
world wide.  The patent on Vioxx was set to expire on December 24, 2013, giving it 
about nine more years on patent at the time it was removed from the market.  This 
represents nine years of profits, along with any additional sales that could have been 
made after the patent expired.   
 
The third event in the study showed that the market efficiently reflected the lost value to 
Merck when the patent of Fosamax16 was set to expire in February 2008, instead of when 
it was originally set to expire in February 2018.17  This decision was made by the US 
Court of Appeals on January 28, 2005.
                                                 
16
 More information about the drug Fosamax can be found in Appendix E.  
17
 This is not actually a loss of patent to Merck, but rather a patent that is “…unenforceable due to findings 
of invalidity.  Merck did not lose 10 years of patent term, regarding the one weekly dosing of Fosamax, 
rather, their patent was held to be invalid over a prior art reference (that means they cannot exclude others 
from making, selling or using the subject matter of the patent claims…).”  Email correspondence from the 
USPTO (Mary Till) July 13, 2006.  More information about the USPTO can be found in Appendix F.   
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Initial patent life 
 
 
 
1/28/05                    2/6/08                         2/6/18 
 
      Lost Patent Life 
New patent life 
 
Figure 5.1 Fosamax Patent Loss 
 
The gap between the initial patent life and the new patent life left Merck with a $7 billion 
loss on January 28, 2005.  This means the market value of the last ten years of Merck’s 
patent on Fosamax is $7 billion (b).  With the years lost in patent and current sales of the 
drug, an internal rate of return (IRR) can be calculated.  To find the IRR, I solve: 
 
 7 b = Σ130=i  ( Sales / (1 + r)i ) – Σ30=i ( Sales / (1 + r)i ) (1) 
 
Where sales will be the sales of the drug expected during that year.  In order to solve for 
r, which will give the IRR, I have to assume what sales will be.  In “Safety, Patent Issues 
Weigh on Big Pharma” published in Forbes by Peter Kang on January 28, 2005, the sales 
of Fosamax were expected to be $3.6 billion.  The sales in 2005 were actually $3.2 
billion, but the day the event occurred, the market expectation was $3.6 billion.  Although 
the expected sales are $3.6 billion dollars, the market only reacts to profits from sales.   
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In 2005, Merck’s gross margin on sales was 76%, which means that of the $3.6 billion 
dollars of sales, $2.7 billion is the approximate profit margin: 
 
 7 b = Σ130=i  ( 2.7 b / (1 + r)i ) – Σ30=i ( 2.7 b / (1 + r)i )   (2) 
 
Although Merck will lose the patent rights on Fosamax, this does not mean they will not 
be able to sell any.  This means that they will have some reduced sales of the drug after 
the patent expires.  Many studies have been conducted to examine what happens to the 
price of a drug when its patent expires.  Because price can change in any direction—up, 
down, or remain constant—it is the remaining market share of the drug that reveals more 
information.  Studies by Grabowski and Vernon (1992) and Caves, Whinston, and 
Hurwitz (1991) show that in the first year of patent loss a drugs market share will 
decrease by 20 to 30 percent.  The following year’s market share falls by 30 to 50 
percent, and by the third year out, it will have lost a total of 80 percent of its market 
share.  It is also important to know that the number of generics need to be large (more 
than 5), for this to occur.  But at sales of $3.2 billion in 2005, ranking it in the top 20 for 
total sales,18 I feel it safe to say that generics will be entering the market as soon as the 
patent expires.19  These additional sales off-patent were to occur after the initial patent 
loss in 2018, but will now occur after the new patent expire date of 2008.   
 
 
 
                                                 
18
 This is using the sales of Fosamax in the United States in 2004, Fosamax was 20th with 1.9 billion dollars 
of sales in 2004 (found at Rxlist.com, $1.9 billion is the Weighted Average Cost times number of 
prescriptions). 
19
 Since then Fosamax has been linked to a very rare jaw disorder that can cause the jaw to shatter.  This 
information was not known at the time of the patent loss thus should have no effect on my estimates. 
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Thus (simplified because beyond year 15 they will both be discounting 80 percent of the 
sales and thus will cancel each-other out):  
 
 7 b = Σ130=i  ( 2.7 b / (1 + r)i ) + ( 2.7 b * .75 / (1 + r)14 ) + ( 2.7 b * .6 / (1 + r)15 )) – Σ30=i ( 
2.7 b / (1 + r)i ) + ( 2.7 b * .75 / (1 + r)4 ) + ( 2.7 b * .6 / (1 + r)5 + Σ156=i ( 2.7 b * .2 /  
 (1 + r)i ) (3) 
 
Here I find an IRR of 13.2 percent (11.7 percent when using the gross profit margin on 
$3.2 billion).  I use this as an estimated market IRR for Merck, not the specific drug but 
the company itself.  This IRR can now be used to estimate Merck’s lost profits when 
Vioxx was withdrawn from the shelves.20   
 
Using the IRR, it is now possible to see what the loss in profits was for Vioxx, which sold 
$2.5 billion the year before it was removed from the market.21  The Vioxx patent was set 
to expire in December of 2013.  Merck’s gross margin during the last year Vioxx was 
still sold (2003), was 80 percent meaning that the $2.5 billion in sales is $2 billion in 
profits: 
 
Σ
9
0=i ( 2 b / (1 + .132)i ) + ( 2 b * .75 / (1 + .132)10 ) + ( 2 b * .6 / (1 + .132)11 )  
 + Σ∞12=i ( 2 b * .2 / (1 + .132)i ) = 11.5 b (4) 
 
Thus the total loss of profits to Merck from the withdrawal of Vioxx is $11.5 billion.22   
 
                                                 
20
 With Vioxx’s sales of $2.5 billion it is safe to assume that it also would have had sufficient generic entry 
(in 2004 U. S. sales of Vioxx were ranked 37th). 
21
 It is valuable to note that both these drugs are developed for the same demographics, primarily older 
people, along with the fact that they both seemed to have hit a plateau in terms of sales.   
22
 Vioxx had 9 years and 3 months of patent remaining, the 3 months was controlled for when solving.  
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Sensitivity of Fosamax patent loss 
 
When Merck lost ten patent years from their drug Fosamax, the market cap decreased by 
$7 billion.  This loss is due to their loss in the patent, but the loss in profits may be more 
than the $7 billion if the expected probability of Merck losing this case was greater than 
zero.  Because of this, I look at the value of the loss in patent for variations in the 
probability of Merck’s victory in this case. 
 
As the expected probability of victory (of this case) falls, the amount lost due to the 
expected profits on Fosamax increases: 
 
Probability of Victory * Expected Loss = Change in Market Capitalization 
Pr (win) * E (loss) = ∆ Mkt. Cap 
1 * $7 b = $ 7b 
 
So for the $7 billion loss the day the USPTO ruled against Merck for the loss of ten years 
of their patent on Fosamax, the expectations of Merck’s victory in this case would have 
had to have been 100 percent.  It is reasonable to believe that some investors believed 
that Merck could lose, so to look at the effects of the probability of victory on the payout, 
I will change the probability to see how this reflects losses in Merck’s market 
capitalization for this event.   
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If the expected probability of victory decreased to 90 percent: 
 
Pr (win) * E (loss) = ∆ Mkt. Cap 
.9 * $7.78 b = $ 7b 
 
This shows that when the expected probability of victory goes down, the expected loss in 
Merck, due to the lost patent, increases.  If the expected probability at the time of the 
announcement was actually 90 percent, instead of 100 percent, the total loss due to the 
patent is $7.78 billion.  This $7.78 billion would show up as $7 billion at the 
announcement because part of the adjustment was already made in the expectations of the 
outcome.  
 
 
Table 5.1 – Sensitivity test for Merck’s probability of victory on Fosamax patent case: 
  
Expected 
Probability  
of Victory 
Actual 
Patent loss 
Valuation 
Change  
the day of 
announcement 
100% 7.01 7.01 
90% 7.79 7.01 
80% 8.76 7.01 
70% 10.01 7.01 
60% 11.68 7.01 
50% 14.02 7.01 
40% 17.53 7.01 
30% 23.37 7.01 
The actual loss and change the day of announcement are in billions of dollars 
 
As you can see, as the expected probability of victory falls, the actual amount lost due to 
the loss in patent increases.  To see how this changes the IRR and the expected loss in 
profits to Vioxx, see table 5.2 below: 
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Table 5.2 – Sensitivity test for Merck’s probability of victory on Fosamax patent case: 
 
Expected 
Probability  
of Victory 
Value of  
Patent IRR 
Loss to  
Vioxx 
100 7.01 13.24% 11.48 
90 7.79 11.87% 12.31 
80 8.76 10.38% 13.37 
75 9.33 9.6%* 14.01 
70 10.01 8.74% 14.80 
60 11.68 6.90% 16.94 
50 14.02 4.80% 20.70 
42.58 16.44 3.03%** 26.78 
40 17.53 2.34% 31.26 
30 23.37 -0.67%  
* - CAPM estimate of IRR for Merck 
** - IRR that shows all lose the day of the withdrawal is due to lost profits from Vioxx 
 
 
Using the CAPM framework to get that the expected probability of victory was 75 
percent and not 100 percent, the loss of profits due to the withdrawal of Vioxx was 
$14.01 billion.   
 
Because it is unknown what the actual probability of Merck winning this case was, I used 
$7 billion.  This case was an appeal from lower court cases in which Merck had won the 
lower court decision.   
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CHAPTER SIX 
PROBABILITY OF MERCK VICTORY 
 
The market value (MV) is equal to the discounted expected future cash flows (Ç) of a 
company. 
 MV = Σ∞t=0 Çt (5) 
 
When a recall occurs, there is a direct cost (θ) of the recall.  Thus, 
 MV = Σ∞t=0 Çt – θ (6) 
 
so the direct costs will be taken from the value of the firm.  These direct costs, according 
to Merck’s 2005 Annual Report’s financial section, will be the costs of recalling the 
previously sold products ($491.6 million), loss of current inventory ($93.2 million), and 
the costs to undertake the withdrawal ($141.4 million).  This leaves the total direct cost of 
recall at $726.2 million, which is $552.6 million post tax.23  Because I cannot find the 
markets estimate of this θ the day the announcement was made, I will assume the 
market’s estimation was close to the after-tax cost of the recall, or $552.6 million. 
 
The recall will not only entail the direct costs of the recall, but the legal costs of lawsuits 
that will follow.  The first of the legal costs are the fixed legal costs (ρ).  Fixed legal costs 
would be the initial gathering of the data to support their case, along with gathering a 
                                                 
23
 From Merck’s 2005 annual report. 
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legal team to do the proceedings.  There will also be a marginal cost of litigation (φ),24 
which will be the lawyer and any other marginal costs representing the firm at each court 
case, times the number of cases heard (σ).   
 MV = Σ∞t=0 Çt – θ – ρ – (φ * σ) (7) 
 
The additional, and arguably largest, cost of the recall will be the expected payout for all 
cases lost.  The expected total payout from litigation will also be encompassed in the 
market value.  This expected total payout will be the payout awarded for any given 
litigation (ξ) multiplied by the number of cases (δ) and the probability of losing each 
individual case (γ).25 
 E [total payout] = ξ * δ * γ (8) 
 
This gives a total market value when the recall occurs: 
 MV = Σ∞t=0 Çt – θ – ρ – (φ * σ) – E [total payout] (9) 
 
or 
 MV = Σ∞t=0 Çt – θ – ρ – (φ * σ) – (ξ * δ * γ)  
 
Merck also loses its ability to sell Vioxx, both under patent and after patent expiry.  This 
means that the expected profits (E[pi]) will also have to be taken out of the market value.   
 MV = Σ∞t=0 Çt – θ – ρ – (φ * σ) – (ξ * δ * γ) – E[pi] (10) 
                                                 
24
 The cost will be for the litigation for each lawsuit because markets react negatively to companies that 
settle rather then taking it to court.  This and Merck’s stated confidence in their ability to win cases causes 
me to assume that all cases that are filed will go to trial. 
25
 The probability of loss is used here because Merck will only have to pay a plaintiff (PĿ) if Merck loses 
the case. 
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To determine the change on the market value I can subtract the market value of the firm 
after the recall (MVa) from the market value of the firm before the recall was announced 
(MVb).  Thus the change in the market value (∆ MV) is: 
 ∆ MV = MVb - MVa  
or 
 ∆ MV = (Σ∞t=0 Çt) – (Σ∞t=0 Çt – θ – ρ – (φ * σ) – (ξ * δ * γ) – E[pi])  
 = θ + ρ + (φ * σ) + (ξ * δ * γ) + E[pi] (11) 
 
To find the probability of Merck winning cases (ω), I must first find γ then subtract it 
from one.   
 ω = 1 – γ (12) 
 
The significant change in market value (∆ MV) was $26.8 billion the day Merck recalled 
Vioxx.  In addition, the direct costs were $552.6 million (m) and the total loss in profits 
was $11.48 billion, based on estimates from the previous patent loss section. 
 26.8 b = 552.6 m + ρ + (φ * σ) + (ξ * δ * γ) + 11.5 b (13) 
 
Thus, 
 14.73 b = ρ + (φ * σ) + (ξ * δ * γ)  
 
At the time of the withdrawal, it was estimated that Merck would have to face nearly 
10,000 cases. 
 14.73 b = ρ + (φ * σ) + (γ * 10,000 * ξ) (14) 
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Merck established approximately $675 million26 in reserve to cover the initial and future 
legal costs over Vioxx (later increased by $295 million, but this was after the time of the 
withdrawal).  I assume that this is an accurate, and known, estimate at the time of the 
removal. 
 
                                                 
26
 December 15, 2006: Merck has set aside $1.6 billion to cover litigation costs and nothing for liability. 
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As Merck increases the funds to cover the marginal cost of cases, each dollar they 
increase it covers more cases then it did before. 
 
  Legal Cost 
  $1.6 b 
   
 
  $685 m 
 
 
                    X           Z  Number of cases (δ) 
Figure 6.1 Legal Cost Per Case 
 
Where X < (Z – X), showing that as Merck increases the amount set aside for legal costs, 
doubling the money will cover more then double the cases.  The initial legal cost is then 
$675 million, which will include the legal cost and the marginal cost of the cases they 
expect to go to trial.  This number will grow over time.  After the first three cases were 
heard, this number increased to $685 million, so X = 3, and the total cases heard when 
Merck increased this number to $1.6 billion was 13 (Z = 13) — ten additional cases for 
the additional $915 million dollars (Z – X = 10).  Because this goes up over time, the 
average increase in this number over a year is accounted for when solving for the 
probability of a case after more money is put into this account.   
ρ + (φ * σ) = 675 m 
 
So 
 14.73 b = 675 m + (ξ * 10,000 * γ) 
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or 
 14.05 b = (ξ * 10,000 * γ)  
 
If the average litigation payout, ξ, is $5 million,27 then 
 
 14.05 b = (5 m * 10,000 * γ) (15) 
 
14.05 b / (5 m * 10,000) = γ 
 
28.1 = γ 
 
ω = 1 – 28.1 = 71.9 
 
Using these assumptions, Merck’s probability of loss is 28.1 percent, making the 
probability that Merck will win a case 71.9 percent.   
 
Because the expected payout per case can vary depending on who you ask, what I will 
look at is the relative probability change.  This will work because as long as the expected 
payout used remains constant, this relative change will hold (using mid point formula).  
This uses the value found in equation 15, but adds the additional amount lost at any given 
event. 
 
                                                 
 
27
 I used $5 million as the expected payout. This number can be debated greatly, and it is hard to tell what 
the expected payout would be per case when this event occurred.  However, because I use the relative 
probability change as each event occurs, this payout will only affect the initial starting point.  Of the $14.05 
billion loss, Merck’s financial statements indicate that they will lose $3 billion in ‘goodwill’ (brand name 
capital), this would increase the initial probability of success to 77.9 percent.   
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After The Wall Street Journal announced that Merck executives knew about the increased 
cardiovascular events in the mid-to-late 1990’s their probability of successful litigation 
decreased by 18.7 percent.  But when the FDA announced its support of Cox-2 inhibitors, 
despite their increased heart risk, Merck’s probability of success increased by 28.5 
percent.  Merck lost their first case when a Texas jury voted 10-2 in favor of the plaintiff. 
This caused the market value of Merck to fall by $5.1 billion, which caused their 
probability of success to decrease by 13.4 percent.  After each case, the probability of 
victory for Merck was: second case (7.5%), third (-4.2%), fourth (-2.7%), fifth (3.7%), 
sixth (-1.4%), seventh (1.8%), eighth (1.6%), and ninth (-14.6%).28 
                                                 
28
 It is also important to note that since this ruling, the judge threw out the $51 million as “excessive” pay.  
The amount Merck will have to pay is still not known. 
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Win 100% 
 
Initial 
Win % 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Time (Events) 
Figure 6.2 Expected Probability of Merck Victory 
 
 
Table 6.1 – What happens when the assumptions change? 
 
    Sensitivity   
 Baseline ∆ E[pi] ∆ Legal Cost ∆ Payout 
ω 71.9% 76.9% 73.7% 85.90% 
E[pi] $11.5 billion $14.01 billion $11.5 billion $11.5 billion 
Legal Cost $675 million $675 million $1.6 billion $675 million 
Payout $5 million $5 million $5 million $10 million 
 
 
As you can see from table 6.1 above, the payout per case has the largest effect on 
changing the probability outcome.29  The cases that have been heard are the cases that 
will most likely have the highest payouts, so I look at these cases as an upper bound 
estimate.  Thus even though the average of the payouts seems high to this point, it makes 
sense to have the average expected payout to be lower than that level.  For this reason, I 
also use the relative probability change; this will give an accurate estimate of the change 
in probability no matter what the starting expected probability is.   
 
                                                 
29
 The amount the probability will change can be found below in table 6.2. 
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Table 6.2 -- Probability outcomes as expected payout changes: 
 
Expected  
Payout 
Probability  
of Loss 
Probability 
of Win 
$3 million 47% 53% 
$5 million 28% 72% 
$10 million 14% 86% 
$20 million 7% 93% 
 
 
Should Merck have withdrawn when they did? 
 
 
 Sales 
           $2.5 
      B 
  $2    A         
      
            C  
      
         Time 
 #CE                        NEJM     Withdraw 
 
 
 
      10,000 = CEw 
 
 
 
          CEi 
 
         Time 
 
Figure 6.3 Timing of Withdrawal 
 
Merck lost $26.8 billion from the announcement, and of that, $11.5 billion was a loss in 
expected profits.  This left $15.3 billion dollars as the total cost of cases Merck was 
expected to face, while Merck was selling $2.5 billion dollars a year of the drug.  
Because I don’t have the ability to adequately separate the $15.3 billion into what is a 
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loss in brand name capital and what are expected litigation costs, I can’t find the exact 
amount of C, but I do know that the $15.3 is the combination of those two.  If it was a 
good idea, then this should be smaller then area B.  Here, area B is the total amount of 
sales from Vioxx from late 2000 until late 2004.  Using the same internal rate of return 
solved for earlier (13.2 percent) to discount forward, the value of sales over that period 
the day of the withdrawal was $15.9 billion. That $15.9 billion is the amount made in 
sales, but the actual amount made in profits is $12.7 billion. 
 
From this information Merck should have withdrawn the drug and written a rebuttal 
when the NEJM was published.  For Merck to be indifferent between the early 
withdrawal and withdrawing in September 2004, Merck would have had to expect brand 
name capital to fall by at least $2.6 billion dollars from the early withdrawal.30  Another 
reason that Merck would have been better off by keeping Vioxx on the market is that if 
the executives knew the withdrawal would have such an effect on stock price, they could 
use the currently inflated stock to acquire other companies.  They could also use these 
inflated stocks for stock options that were immediately executable. 
 
                                                 
30
 It is equal to $6 billion at the withdrawal date, but discounted back to the NEJM is $4.7 billion.  This 
could also encompass any expected legal cases if Merck would have had to battle them at that time. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
Using an event-study format, I show that the market reacts immediately to all the events.  
With that information, I am able to calculate the loss to Merck by looking at their market 
capitalization change when any particular event occurs.  Knowing that the market reacts 
immediately to information, we find that when Merck removed Vioxx from the shelves, it 
had a loss in market value of $26.8 billion.  After The Wall Street Journal published an 
article stating that Merck executives knew since the mid-to-late 1990’s that Vioxx 
increases the risk of cardiovascular events, the market value of Merck fell another $6.7 
billion.  This gave the company a total loss of $33.5 billion.  When Merck initially 
withdrew Vioxx from the shelves, there was an expected probability of 72 percent that 
Merck would win a lawsuit filed against it, but when the information was released by The 
Wall Street Journal, their probability of winning a lawsuit decreased to around 59 
percent.   
 
More information was revealed when the FDA announced its support of Cox-2 inhibitors 
which decreased the total loss of Merck to $25.2 billion.  However, they lost their first 
case in August of 2005 causing an additional loss to Merck’s market capitalization of 
$5.1 billion, increasing the total loss to Merck to $30.3 billion.  This changed Merck’s 
chances of winning future cases, moving the final probability of winning any given case 
to 65 percent.  As of August 17, 2006 (after the first nine cases were heard), the 
probability of Merck successfully defending its cases is 59 percent.   
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Although the loss in market capitalization is large, the expected loss to the company is 
not entirely due to legal issues.  When Merck removed Vioxx from the shelves it 
eliminated its third largest drug from the market, at $2.5 billion a year.  So in removing 
Vioxx from sale, it also took away a large profit-making drug from the company.  To find 
the loss in value to the company due to profit loss, I use the drug Fosamax to find an 
internal rate of return for the company.  I find that the market gives a 13.2 percent 
internal rate of return to Merck’s drugs, allowing an estimation of profit loss from the 
removal of Vioxx to reach $11.5 billion.   
 
With this information, we can observe how the market reflects the change in the 
probability of Merck winning cases.  I also find that Merck’s decision to withdraw in 
September 2004, rather than 2000, seems to have been (ex-post) a questionable decision.  
Because of the lag in information from the drug industry, this also signals that Merck did 
not know of the risks of Vioxx before the withdrawal.  If they did know how substandard 
the drug was, they would have withdrawn it at an earlier date.   
 
Future studies in this area will explore how long it takes, or how many cases have to he 
heard, for the market to find a stable probability of Merck’s success as well as litigation 
outcomes over time.  Future research will continue to look at this recall information, at 
Merck and at other companies that deal with the recall decision, to analyze an incentive 
mis-alignment, socially tolerable risk, and ways to find accurate estimates of the losses.  
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Appendix A 
 
Merck Charts 
 
Figure A1  
Merck chart from Aug. 23, 2004 to Aug 23, 2006 (from bigcharts.com). 
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Figure A2  
Merck’s daily returns from August 17, 2004 to August 17, 2006. 
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Figure A3 
Time to Cardiovascular Adverse Event in the VIGOR Trial 
 
 
 
This figure is from figure 1 in the paper "Risk of Cardiovascular Events Associated With 
Selective COX-2 Inhibitors" by Mukherjee, Nissen, and Topol published in Journal of 
the American Medical Association, August 22/29, 2001 - Vol 286, No. 8 located on page 
956. 
 
“Copyright © 2001, American Medical Association.  All rights reserved.” 
Reprinted with permission
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Appendix B 
 
Other Event-Studies 
 
 
Table B1-4 
Event One, three-day event study before event, including event day and without event 
day:  September 30, 2004: 
Mrkonebef 
(Before Event One With Day) 
Mrkonebefwoday  
(Before Event One 
Without day) 
  
Company 
  VWI S&P VWI S&P 
Merck & Co -0.087 -0.087 0.008 0.007 
  (8.37)** (8.38)** (0.68) (0.68) 
Pfizer, Inc 0.008 0.008 0.005 0.005 
  (1.15) (1.23) (0.75) (0.75) 
-0.003 -0.003 0.002 0.002 Johnson & 
Johnson (0.71) (0.7) (0.37) (0.36) 
0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 GlaxoSmithKlin
e plc Adr (0.78) (0.83) (0.87) (0.87) 
0.01 0.01 0.014 0.014 Sanofi-Aventis 
Ads (1.27) (1.32) (1.8) (1.8) 
Amgen Inc -0.003 -0.003 0.004 0.003 
  (0.4) (0.33) (0.45) (0.44) 
-0.008 -0.008 -0.009 -0.009 AstraZeneca 
Ads  (1.05) (1.01) (1.18) (1.19) 
-0.003 -0.003 -0.001 -0.001 Abbott 
Laboratories  (0.54) (0.49) (0.19) (0.2) 
Wyeth -0.001 0 -0.001 -0.001 
  (0.09) (0.04) (0.14) (0.15) 
Lilly (eli) -0.019 -0.018 -0.01 -0.011 
  (2.53)* (2.49)* (1.42) (1.45) 
-0.001 0 -0.001 -0.002 Bristol-Myers 
Squibb (0.15) (0.07) (0.26) (0.28) 
Schering-Plough 0.005 0.005 -0.005 -0.005 
  (0.58) (0.64) (0.6) (0.61) 
-0.009 -0.008 -0.009 -0.009 Teva Pharm 
Indus Adr (1.01) (0.93) (1.03) (1.04) 
Forest Labs 0.004 0.005 0 0 
  (0.37) (0.41) (0.03) (0.02) 
-0.007 -0.006 -0.005 -0.005 King 
Pharmaceuticals (0.43) (0.41) (0.31) (0.32) 
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%, Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses 
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Table B1-5 
Event One, month after event and three months after event:  September 30, 2004 
 
Company 
Monthafterone 
(Event One Month After) 
Mrkthreemonone (Event 
One Three Months After) 
 VWI S&P VWI S&P 
Merck & Co -0.002 -0.002 0 0 
 (0.4) (0.41) (0.11) (0.12) 
Pfizer, Inc -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 
 (0.97) (1) (1.64) (1.66) 
Johnson & Johnson 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (0.58) (0.58) (0.93) (0.93) 
-0.002 -0.002 0 0.001 GlaxoSmithKline plc 
Adr (0.94) (0.94) (0.35) (0.37) 
Sanofi-Aventis Ads -0.001 -0.001 0 0 
 (0.35) (0.34) (0.08) (0.11) 
Amgen Inc -0.001 -0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (0.23) (0.23) (0.31) (0.35) 
AstraZeneca Ads 0 0 -0.003 -0.003 
 (0.12) (0.12) (1.7) (1.68) 
0 0 0.001 0.001 Abbott Laboratories 
 (0.08) (0.08) (0.59) (0.62) 
Wyeth 0.003 0.003 0.001 0.002 
 (0.88) (0.89) (0.83) (0.85) 
Lilly (eli) -0.004 -0.004 -0.002 -0.002 
 (1.54) (1.56) (1.01) (1) 
-0.001 -0.001 0 0.001 
Bristol-Myers Squibb (0.35) (0.36) (0.37) (0.41) 
Schering-Plough -0.003 -0.003 0 0 
 (1.13) (1.14) (0.02) (0) 
-0.001 -0.001 0.001 0.001 Teva Pharm Indus Adr 
 (0.17) (0.16) (0.54) (0.59) 
Forest Labs 0 0 0 0 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.05) (0.02) 
-0.005 -0.005 0 0 King Pharmaceuticals 
 (0.79) (0.79) (0.04) (0.03) 
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%, Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses 
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Table B1-6 
Event One, month before event and three months before event: September 30, 2004 
 
  
Company 
Monthbeofreone 
(Event One Month Before) 
Threemonbeofone (Event 
One Three Months Before) 
  VWI S&P VWI S&P 
Merck & Co 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
  (0.27) (0.32) (0.36) (0.37) 
Pfizer, Inc -0.004 -0.003 -0.001 -0.001 
  (1.36) (1.28) (0.62) (0.63) 
Johnson & Johnson -0.001 -0.001 0 0.001 
  (0.67) (0.6) (0.43) (0.46) 
0.002 0.002 0.001 0.001 GlaxoSmithKline plc 
Adr  (0.97) (1.03) (0.45) (0.44) 
Sanofi-Aventis Ads 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002 
  (0.26) (0.32) (1.15) (1.14) 
Amgen Inc -0.002 -0.002 0.002 0.002 
  (0.69) (0.59) (0.96) (0.96) 
AstraZeneca Ads -0.006 -0.005 -0.002 -0.002 
  (1.95) (1.9) (0.99) (1) 
0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 Abbott Laboratories  
 (0.24) (0.33) (0.75) (0.75) 
Wyeth 0 0 0.001 0.001 
  (0.05) (0.03) (0.65) (0.65) 
Lilly (eli) -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
  (0.71) (0.63) (1.04) (1.05) 
0 0 0 0 Bristol-Myers Squibb 
  (0.18) (0.08) (0.25) (0.24) 
Schering-Plough -0.002 -0.002 0 0 
  (0.8) (0.72) (0.13) (0.13) 
-0.004 -0.003 -0.004 -0.004 Teva Pharm Indus Adr  
 (1.13) (1.04) (1.86) (1.88) 
Forest Labs -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 -0.003 
  (0.49) (0.45) (1.27) (1.28) 
-0.002 -0.002 0.002 0.002 King Pharmaceuticals  
 (0.41) (0.38) (0.45) (0.45) 
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%, Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses 
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Table B2-1 
Percent change during the listed events 
 
  
Mistrial 
declaired 
on Dec. 
12, 2005 
Merck 
wins case 
on Feb. 
18, 2006 
Merck 
splits 
cases on 
Apr. 5, 
2006 
Merck 
loses case 
on Apr. 
21, 2006 
          
  12/9/2005  2/17/2006  4/4/2006  4/20/2006  
  12/10/2005  2/21/2006  4/5/2006  4/21/2006  
Company %∆ %∆ %∆ %∆ 
Merck & Co 2.53% 1.29% -1.42% 0.75% 
Pfizer, Inc -1.62% 0.70% -0.28% 0.32% 
Johnson & Johnson -0.07% -0.12% 0.72% -0.26% 
GlaxoSmithKline plc Adr -0.71% 0.41% 0.48% 0.25% 
Sanofi-Aventis Ads -1.18% 2.55% 0.81% 0.56% 
Amgen Inc 1.19% 0.48% -1.15% 2.53% 
AstraZeneca Ads -0.93% -0.88% -0.49% -1.37% 
Abbott Laboratories -0.46% 0.80% -0.16% -0.21% 
Wyeth -0.09% 0.37% 1.47% -1.54% 
Lilly (eli) -1.95% 0.61% 0.53% 1.30% 
Bristol-Myers Squibb 0.42% 0.87% 0.86% -0.44% 
Schering-Plough 0.31% 0.16% -0.21% -1.27% 
Teva Pharm Indus Adr 1.53% 1.32% 0.88% 0.53% 
Forest Labs -1.55% 1.71% -0.45% 0.21% 
King Pharmaceuticals -1.86% -0.05% -0.97% 1.66% 
Dow Jones Industrial 
Average 0.10% 0.42% -0.32% -0.04% 
S & P 500 Index -0.08% 0.33% -0.43% 0.01% 
AMEX pharmaceutical 
index -0.40% 0.66% 0.15% 0.17% 
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Table B2-2 
Percent change during the listed events 
 
  
Merck 
wins case 
on Jul. 
13, 2006 
Merck 
wins 
case 
Aug. 2, 
2006 
Merck loses case Aug. 
17, 2006 (judge also 
throws out Merck's Nov 
'05 win) 
        
  7/12/2006  8/1/2006  8/16/2006  
  7/13/2006  8/2/2006  8/17/2006  
Company %∆ %∆ %∆ 
Merck & Co -0.65% -0.51% -5.71% 
Pfizer, Inc 1.36% 1.48% 0.93% 
Johnson & Johnson 0.58% -0.74% -0.59% 
GlaxoSmithKline plc Adr 1.47% 1.82% -1.37% 
Sanofi-Aventis Ads 3.21% 0.94% 0.04% 
Amgen Inc 0.93% -1.00% 0.47% 
AstraZeneca Ads 1.99% 0.37% -0.94% 
Abbott Laboratories 0.27% 0.76% -0.30% 
Wyeth 2.07% 0.04% 0.32% 
Lilly (eli) 1.35% -1.12% 0.70% 
Bristol-Myers Squibb 1.21% 0.46% 1.90% 
Schering-Plough 0.48% 0.05% 0.30% 
Teva Pharm Indus Adr 3.64% -1.96% -0.37% 
Forest Labs 0.42% -0.19% 3.38% 
King Pharmaceuticals 0.47% 0.23% -0.97% 
Dow Jones Industrial 
Average 1.54% -0.66% 0.07% 
S & P 500 Index 1.31% -0.51% 0.16% 
AMEX pharmaceutical 
index 1.32% 0.34% -0.44% 
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Table B3-1 
Total market capitalization change during the listed event:  
 
  
Mistrial 
declaired 
on Dec. 
12, 2005 
Merck 
wins case 
on Feb. 
18, 2006 
Merck 
splits 
cases on 
Apr. 5, 
2006 
Merck 
loses case 
on Apr. 
21, 2006 
          
  12/9/2005  2/17/2006  4/4/2006  4/20/2006  
Company 12/12/2005  2/21/2006  4/5/2006  4/21/2006  
Merck & Co -1.57 -1.01 1.12 -0.57 
Pfizer, Inc 2.5 -1.32 0.52 -0.59 
Johnson & Johnson 0.12 0.21 -1.25 0.45 
GlaxoSmithKline plc 
Adr 1.05 -0.61 -0.73 -0.38 
Sanofi-Aventis Ads 1.36 -2.98 -1.03 -0.7 
Amgen Inc -1.14 -0.44 1.04 -2.09 
AstraZeneca Ads 0.72 0.64 0.4 1.19 
Abbott Laboratories 0.28 -0.54 0.11 0.14 
Wyeth 0.05 -0.24 -0.95 0.98 
Lilly (eli) 1.21 -0.39 -0.33 -0.78 
Bristol-Myers Squibb -0.18 -0.39 -0.41 0.22 
Schering-Plough -0.09 -0.04 0.06 0.37 
Teva Pharm Indus Adr -0.41 -0.33 -0.23 -0.13 
Forest Labs 0.21 -0.26 0.07 -0.03 
King Pharmaceuticals 0.07 0 0.04 -0.07 
          
Sum: 4.18 -7.71 -1.59 -2 
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Table B3-2 
Total market capitalization change during the listed event:  
 
  
Merck 
wins case 
on Jul. 
13, 2006 
Merck 
wins 
case 
Aug. 2, 
2006 
Merck loses case Aug. 
17, 2006 (judge also 
throws out Merck's Nov 
'05 win) 
        
  7/12/2006  8/1/2006  8/16/2006 
Company 7/13/2006  8/2/2006  8/17/2006 
Merck & Co 0.52 0.46 -5.14 
Pfizer, Inc -2.28 -2.8 1.84 
Johnson & Johnson -1.04 1.4 -1.13 
GlaxoSmithKline plc 
Adr -2.33 -2.85 -2.21 
Sanofi-Aventis Ads -4.17 -1.19 0.05 
Amgen Inc -0.75 0.88 0.38 
AstraZeneca Ads -1.87 -0.35 -0.95 
Abbott Laboratories -0.18 -0.55 -0.23 
Wyeth -1.2 -0.03 0.2 
Lilly (eli) -0.84 0.73 0.44 
Bristol-Myers Squibb -0.59 -0.22 0.78 
Schering-Plough -0.13 -0.01 0.09 
Teva Pharm Indus Adr -0.69 0.41 -0.08 
Forest Labs -0.05 0.03 0.52 
King Pharmaceuticals -0.02 -0.01 -0.04 
        
Sum: -15.62 -4.11 -5.47 
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Table B4-1 
Event two’s reaction to the market on November 1, 2004 (The Wall Street Journal 
Report): 
 
Mrktwo Mrktwowoday Monaftertwo 
(1) (2) (3) 
Company VWI VWI VWI 
Merck & Co -0.039 -0.019 0 
  (3.50)** (1.73) (0.11) 
Pfizer, Inc 0.003 -0.003 -0.002 
  (0.44) (0.46) (0.58) 
Johnson & Johnson 0.004 0 0.001 
  (0.78) (0.02) (0.64) 
0.014 0.008 -0.001 GlaxoSmithKline plc 
Adr  (2.28)* (1.32) (0.22) 
Sanofi-Aventis Ads 0 0.004 0 
  (0.01) (0.49) (0.05) 
Amgen Inc 0.006 0.011 0.003 
  (0.84) (1.43) (1.04) 
AstraZeneca Ads 0.01 0.011 -0.002 
  (1.34) (1.4) (0.55) 
0.005 0.008 -0.001 
Abbott Laboratories  (0.81) (1.24) (0.32) 
Wyeth 0.007 -0.002 0 
  (0.94) (0.32) (0.15) 
Lilly (eli) 0.008 0.007 -0.001 
  (1.13) (1.01) (0.49) 
0.002 -0.001 0 Bristol-Myers 
Squibb  (0.4) (0.1) (0.03) 
Schering-Plough -0.006 0.006 0 
  (0.76) (0.7) (0.14) 
-0.028 -0.025 0.004 Teva Pharm Indus 
Adr  (3.21)** (2.78)** (1.06) 
Forest Labs -0.02 -0.03 -0.005 
  (1.8) (2.66)** (1.29) 
-0.011 -0.002 0.006 King 
Pharmaceuticals  (0.73) (0.13) (1.02) 
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%, (Absolute value of t statistics) 
1 – Merck Event Two, three-day dummy with day 
2 – Merck Event Two, three-day dummy without day 
3 – Merck Event Two, month after event 
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Table B4-2 
Event two’s reaction to the market on November 1, 2004 (The Wall Street Journal 
Report): 
* 
significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%, (Absolute value of t statistics) 
4 – Merck Event Two, three months after event 
5 – Merck Event Two, month before event 
6 – Merck Event Two, three months before event 
 
 
 
 
Thremontwo Monthbeftwo Thremonbetwo 
(4) (5) (6) 
Company VWI VWI VWI 
Merck & Co 0.001 -0.015 -0.005 
  (0.3) (3.58)** (2.02)* 
Pfizer, Inc -0.003 -0.002 -0.001 
  (1.63) (0.59) (0.66) 
Johnson & Johnson 0.001 0 0 
  (1.21) (0.22) (0.26) 
0 -0.002 0 GlaxoSmithKline plc 
Adr  (0.03) (0.98) (0.13) 
Sanofi-Aventis Ads -0.001 -0.001 0.001 
  (0.48) (0.3) (0.58) 
Amgen Inc 0.001 -0.002 -0.001 
  (0.53) (0.64) (0.46) 
AstraZeneca Ads -0.001 0 -0.002 
  (0.63) (0.1) (0.88) 
0.001 0 0.001 Abbott Laboratories  
 (0.4) (0.04) (0.81) 
Wyeth -0.001 0.002 0.002 
  (0.37) (0.7) (1.02) 
Lilly (eli) 0 -0.005 -0.002 
  (0.09) (1.97)* (1.27) 
0 -0.001 0.001 Bristol-Myers 
Squibb  (0.31) (0.46) (0.71) 
Schering-Plough 0 -0.002 -0.002 
  (0.13) (0.64) (1.15) 
0.002 -0.002 -0.003 Teva Pharm Indus 
Adr  (0.75) (0.58) (1.44) 
Forest Labs 0 0 -0.001 
  (0.18) (0.02) (0.57) 
-0.001 -0.006 -0.002 King 
Pharmaceuticals  (0.26) (1.04) (0.48) 
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Table B5-1 
Event three’s reaction to the market on January 28, 2005 (US Court of Appeals Ruling): 
Mrkthree Mrkthreewoday Monafterthree 
(1) (2) (3) 
Company VWI VWI VWI 
Merck & Co -0.038 0.002 0.007 
  (3.43)** (0.16) (1.48) 
Pfizer, Inc -0.014 -0.008 0.004 
  (1.78) (1.07) (1.37) 
Johnson & Johnson 0.004 0.004 0 
  (0.81) (0.78) (0.02) 
-0.006 -0.002 0.003 GlaxoSmithKline plc 
Adr  (0.98) (0.27) (1.32) 
Sanofi-Aventis Ads -0.004 -0.007 0.002 
  (0.6) (0.95) (0.8) 
Amgen Inc 0 0 -0.002 
  (0.02) (0.02) (0.55) 
AstraZeneca Ads 0.006 0.01 0.003 
  (0.79) (1.36) (0.98) 
Abbott Laboratories -0.002 -0.001 0 
  (0.33) (0.23) (0.03) 
Wyeth -0.032 -0.033 -0.003 
  (4.63)** (4.79)** (1.23) 
Lilly (eli) -0.008 0.005 0.002 
  (1.11) (0.73) (0.7) 
Bristol-Myers Squibb -0.009 0.004 0.003 
  (1.58) (0.65) (1.34) 
Schering-Plough -0.004 -0.003 -0.001 
  (0.47) (0.32) (0.34) 
Teva Pharm Indus Adr 0.01 0.007 0.002 
  (1.1) (0.77) (0.48) 
Forest Labs 0.002 0.009 0.002 
  (0.16) (0.88) (0.58) 
King Pharmaceuticals -0.006 0.001 -0.006 
  (0.4) (0.06) (1) 
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%, (Absolute value of t statistics) 
1 – Merck Event Three, three-day dummy with day 
2 – Merck Event Three, three-day dummy without day 
3 – Merck Event Three, month after event 
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Table B5-2 
Event three’s reaction to the market on January 28, 2005 (US Court of Appeals Ruling): 
Thremonthree Monthbefthree Thremonbethree 
-4 -5 -6 
Company VWI VWI VWI 
Merck & Co 0.005 0 0.001 
  (1.79) (0.07) (0.24) 
Pfizer, Inc 0.004 -0.001 -0.002 
  (1.93) (0.45) (1.23) 
Johnson & Johnson 0.001 0.001 0.001 
  (0.93) (0.5) (1.23) 
0.002 -0.002 0 GlaxoSmithKline plc 
Adr (1.5) (0.79) (0.28) 
Sanofi-Aventis Ads 0.003 -0.003 -0.001 
  (1.73) (1.23) (0.45) 
Amgen Inc -0.001 0 0.001 
  (0.48) (0.12) (0.34) 
AstraZeneca Ads 0.003 0.002 -0.002 
  (1.93) (0.55) (1.23) 
Abbott Laboratories 0.002 0.001 0.001 
  (1.3) (0.27) (0.65) 
Wyeth 0.001 0.001 0.001 
  (0.58) (0.42) (0.43) 
Lilly (eli) 0.003 0 0 
  (1.57) (0.03) (0.12) 
Bristol-Myers Squibb 0.003 -0.001 0 
  (2.32)* (0.3) (0.26) 
Schering-Plough 0.002 -0.004 0 
  (1.03) (1.18) (0.22) 
Teva Pharm Indus Adr 0.002 -0.003 0 
  (0.77) (0.79) (0.01) 
Forest Labs -0.001 -0.001 0 
  (0.25) (0.34) (0.19) 
King Pharmaceuticals -0.005 -0.007 -0.003 
  (1.36) (1.2) (0.78) 
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%, (Absolute value of t statistics) 
4 – Merck Event Three, three months after event 
5 – Merck Event Three, month before event 
6 – Merck Event Three, three months before event 
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Table B6-1 
Event four’s reaction to the market on February 18, 2005 (FDA Announces Support): 
Mrkfour Mrkfourwoday Monafterfour 
(1) (2) (3) 
Company VWI VWI VWI 
Merck & Co 0.038 -0.005 0.001 
  (3.34)** (0.44) (0.12) 
Pfizer, Inc 0.021 -0.004 -0.001 
  (2.63)** (0.45) (0.18) 
Johnson & Johnson 0.002 0.002 0.001 
  (0.32) (0.49) (0.63) 
0.013 0.006 -0.001 GlaxoSmithKline plc 
Adr  (2.11)* (0.95) (0.31) 
Sanofi-Aventis Ads 0.016 0.004 0.004 
  (2.30)* (0.57) (1.32) 
Amgen Inc -0.002 0 -0.003 
  (0.31) (0.03) (0.96) 
AstraZeneca Ads 0.017 0.008 0.002 
  (2.37)* (1.06) (0.63) 
Abbott Laboratories -0.004 0 -0.002 
  (0.59) (0.05) (0.92) 
Wyeth 0.002 -0.001 -0.002 
  (0.31) (0.13) (0.61) 
Lilly (eli) 0.001 0.004 -0.001 
  (0.15) (0.6) (0.55) 
Bristol-Myers Squibb 0.016 0.006 0.001 
  (3.01)** (1.15) (0.28) 
Schering-Plough 0.005 0.001 -0.004 
  (0.63) (0.09) (1.35) 
Teva Pharm Indus Adr 0.01 0.003 0.005 
  (1.13) (0.36) (1.42) 
Forest Labs 0.011 0.005 -0.005 
  (1.1) (0.52) (1.26) 
King Pharmaceuticals 0.011 0.003 -0.007 
  (0.77) (0.23) (1.13) 
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%, (Absolute value of t statistics) 
1 – Merck Event Four, three-day dummy with day 
2 – Merck Event Four, three-day dummy without day 
3 – Merck Event Four, month after event 
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Table B6-2 
Event four’s reaction to the market on February 18, 2005 (FDA Announces Support): 
Thremonfour Monthbeffour Thremonbeffour 
(4) (5) (6) 
Company VWI VWI VWI 
Merck & Co 0.001 -0.003 0.002 
  (0.45) (0.61) (0.73) 
Pfizer, Inc 0.003 0 -0.001 
  (1.48) (0.16) (0.43) 
Johnson & Johnson 0 0.002 0.001 
  (0.41) (0.85) (0.87) 
0.001 0.001 0 GlaxoSmithKline plc 
Adr (0.4) (0.57) (0.26) 
Sanofi-Aventis Ads 0.002 -0.001 -0.001 
  (1.44) (0.51) (0.82) 
Amgen Inc 0 -0.002 0 
  (0.02) (0.75) (0.03) 
AstraZeneca Ads 0.002 0.005 -0.002 
  (0.88) (1.83) (1.12) 
Abbott Laboratories 0.001 0 0.001 
  (0.96) (0.02) (0.83) 
Wyeth 0.002 -0.003 -0.001 
  (0.93) (1.12) (0.31) 
Lilly (eli) 0.002 -0.001 0 
  (1.52) (0.54) (0.18) 
Bristol-Myers Squibb 0.002 -0.001 0 
  (1.55) (0.53) (0.15) 
Schering-Plough 0.001 -0.003 0.001 
  (0.43) (1.19) (0.29) 
Teva Pharm Indus Adr 0.003 -0.004 -0.001 
  (1.53) (1.08) (0.54) 
Forest Labs 0 0 0.002 
  (0.14) (0.09) (0.75) 
King Pharmaceuticals -0.002 -0.005 -0.002 
  (0.47) (0.87) (0.69) 
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%, (Absolute value of t statistics) 
4 – Merck Event Four, three months after event 
5 – Merck Event Four, month before event 
6 – Merck Event Four, three months before event 
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Appendix C 
 
FDA31 
 
 
For a drug to be approved for sale in the US, it must go through a drug application 
process and be approved by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA).  The drug’s initial 
testing is dependent upon whether or not there is another chemical compound being 
distributed like it. If so, then the initial study is to collect data recorded by other uses of 
the drug.  If the drug is a new compound, the sponsor must first show successful clinical 
trials on animals.  This stage involves creating a drug profile and testing the drug, for 
toxicity, in two species of animals for short term tests ranging from two weeks to three 
months.  To formally propose to the FDA that a new pharmaceutical drug should be 
approved, a sponsor must fill out the New Drug Application (NDA).   In the NDA, a drug 
manufacturer will submit nonclinical and clinical (animal and human) test data, analyses 
of the tests, drug information, and a description of the manufacturing process.  The FDA 
will then look at the NDA to decide if the drug is safe, has proper labeling, and if the 
manufacturing process is appropriate.   
 
The clinical tests involve three phases of testing.  Phase one is the initial testing of the 
drug in humans.  This phase is usually done on healthy volunteer subjects and is closely 
monitored.  In phase two the drug begins controlled setting tests.  The second phase will 
also help determine the risks and short-term side effects of the drug.  Phase two usually 
involves small groups for testing, several hundred patients.  The third and final phase is 
comprised of clinical studies.  This phase involves expanded controlled and uncontrolled 
                                                 
31
 Information from FDA website, www.fda.gov 
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trials.  In the third phase, the risk-benefit relationship of the drug is supposed to be 
established. At any point during the three phases, if the study seems to be unsafe, a 
clinical hold can be put in place.   
 
 
 
  77   
Appendix D 
 
ADR 
 
 
There are 3 stocks in this study that are traded on multiple exchanges, on what are called 
the American Depository Receipts, or ADR.  The ADR was established to allow the 
stocks of foreign companies to be sold in the United States.  An ADR is issued by a US 
Bank and represents a foreign stock.  This ADR can represent one or more shares of the 
stock, or a fraction of the stock.  Owning this ADR is owning the right to the foreign 
stock; however, although the ADR’s tend to trade close to the price of the foreign stock, 
it represents, they are not always equal.   
 
ADR’s can come into two different categories Unsponsored and Sponsored: 
Unsponsored –  These ADR’s are sold OTC, over-the-counter, and have no 
regulatory requirements.  These shares can be issued to many 
different banks, with the banks only handling the shares that 
were given to them.  Due to the lack of regulatory 
requirements, hidden fees can be very prevalent, so not many 
unsponsored ADR’s are used anymore.   
Sponsored shares are broken into three different levels, where the lowest level sponsored 
share is Level I. 
Level I -  This level requires a foreign firm to find a transfer agent, or 
one firm to issue sponsored shares.  These shares can only be 
sold OTC and the company has a minimal set of reporting 
requirements set by the SEC (U. S. Securities and Exchange 
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Commission).  Although they do have some minimal reporting 
requirements, they are not required to submit annual reports, 
although they can if they chose to do so. 
 
Level II (listed) -  To establish a level 2 program, a foreign company must 
register with the SEC, and this also allows the SEC to oversee 
the company’s activities along with requiring the company to 
file yearly reports (20-F, similar to a US companies filing of a 
10-K).  The largest advantage of being listed as a level 2 is that 
these companies can now be listed on US stock exchanges.   
 
Level III (offering) -  Requires companies to adhere to the same standards as US 
companies.  Level 3 also allows foreign companies not only to 
deposit shares into depositories, but also allows these 
companies the opportunity to issue shares to raise capital.   
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Appendix E 
Fosamax 
 
Fosamax (alendronate) is a once–a-week drug used to treat osteoporosis in women after 
menopause and to reduce the chances of having a hip or spinal fracture.  Treatment has 
been shown to increase the bone mass in both women and men with osteoporosis with as 
little as three months treatment.  Fosamax tablets can be taken as both a treatment and as 
prevention.  Fosamax alters the cycle of bone formation and breakdown in the body, 
which is called a bisphosphonates.  
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Appendix F 
 
USPTO 
 
 
The Department of Commerce’s United States Patent and Trade Office (USPTO) was 
established in 1790 to provide patent and trademark protection to inventors and 
companies.  The first patent was issued on July 31, 1790 to Samuel Hopkins.  The head 
of the USPTO is the Under Secretary of Commerce for Intellectual Property.  The 
USPTO had around 8,000 employees and examined 332,000 patents in 2006.   
 
The USPTO grants US Patents for intellectual property to inventor(s).  According to the 
USPTO these patents are “the right to exclude others from making, using, offering for 
sale, or selling" the invention in the United States or "importing" the invention into the 
United States. To get a US patent, an application must be filed in the US Patent and 
Trademark Office.32  Most patents filed today with the USPTO are done so electronically.  
These applications are evidence that your idea is unique, and also a manor for the USPTO 
to check that a patent is not something that has already been done by another.   When a 
patent is filed filling, search, and examination fees must be paid, also with these initial 
patent filing fee a maintenance fee must be paid each year in order to maintain the patent 
rights.  Generally the patentee has 20 years of patent protection from the date in which 
the patent was filed.   
 
The USPTO also runs the US Court of Appeals, a court used to hear patent infringement 
cases.  Teva Pharmaceuticals appealed Merck’s lower court victory from the United 
                                                 
32
 From the US Patent and Trade Office’s website, “How to get a patent.” 
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States Court for the District of Delaware to the USPTO.  On January 28, 2005 the court 
ruled that Merck & Co. infringed on Teva Pharmaceuticals patent.  Teva Pharmaceuticals 
claimed that Merck was infringing on their patent, and appealed two parts of the lower 
court decision.  The term ‘about’ was used, and in a lower court ruling was said to be 
clearly defined.  Judge Reader said that about was a general term, not something used in a 
specific manor, and thus was invalid.  The Judge said that the lower courts were wrong in 
their ruling of this case, and thus it was overturned.  This means that Merck did infringe 
upon the Teva Pharmaceuticals patent, and thus will lose time on their patent.  The patent 
life of Fosamax was shortened from expiring in 2018, to expire in 2008. 
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Appendix G 
Detailed Time-Line 
 
Jan. 2, 1970  Merck’s IPO, opening the first day at $112.75. 
 
Nov. 23, 1998  Merck submits NDA (New Drug Application) for 
approval of Vioxx from the FDA. 
 
Jan. 1999  Merck begins VIGOR (Vioxx Gastrointestinal Outcomes 
Research), a trial to test the impact of Vioxx.  Merck 
claims “similar” cardiovascular risk among patients 
taking Vioxx and those on placebo or other pain relievers. 
 
May 20, 1999  FDA approves Vioxx.  (Closing price of $72.25, which is 
a one-day increase of 2.48%) 
 
Feb. 2000  APPROVe (Adenomatous Polyp Prevention Vioxx) 
begins enrollment for a trial to test the effects of Vioxx 
on the recurrence of neoplastic polyps of the large bowel 
in patients. 
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Nov. 23, 2000  VIGOR, which was designed to find the side effects of 
Vioxx, such as stomach ulcers and bleeding, is published 
in The New England Journal of Medicine.33   
 
May 22, 2001  Merck issues a press release titled “Merck Confirms 
Favorable Cardiovascular Safety Profile of Vioxx.” 
 
Sept. 17, 2001  The FDA sends Merck a “Warning Letter” demanding 
that Merck discontinue the promotion of Vioxx to doctors 
for unofficial uses.34 
 
Apr. 11, 2002 Merck revises the Vioxx label to include precautions 
about cardiovascular risk cited in the VIGOR trial.35 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
33 According to Merck, after the journal’s deadline for submission, this study revealed a statistically 
significant increase in the number of cardiovascular events, heart attacks, and strokes in patients taking 
Rofecoxib (Vioxx) as compared to those taking Naproxen (the original transcript was submitted in May of 
2000).  The published article said that there was no increase in cardiovascular events, heart attacks or 
strokes.  The additional information led to an Arthritis Advisory Committee discussion that added safety 
information to the label of Vioxx in April 2002. 
34 Merck was marketing Vioxx for uses in arthritis treatments that had not been proven to the FDA’s 
satisfaction. 
35
 The VIGOR study found that of the 4047 patients taking rofecoxib 111 had cardiovascular events (2.7%), 
while of the 4029 patients taking naproxen 50 had cardiovascular events (1.2%).  This shows Vioxx has 2.2 
times higher chance of having a cardiovascular event then does naproxen.  This is a RR (relative risk) of 
2.22 and a RD (risk difference) of 44%, found in Mukherjee, Nissen, Topol (2001). 
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Sept. 30, 2004 – ‘Event One’ Merck voluntarily removes Vioxx from the shelves after 
the APPROVe study finds that those patients taking 25  
mg of Vioxx for more then eighteen months have an 
increased risk of suffering a heart attack, stroke, or other 
cardiovascular event. 
 
Nov. 1, 2004 – ‘Event Two’  The Wall Street Journal reports that Merck executives 
were worried in the mid-to-late 1990's that Vioxx would 
show greater heart risk than cheaper painkillers which are 
harsh on the stomach but are believed to reduce the risk 
of heart attacks. 
 
Dec. 23, 2004  The FDA issues a public health advisory urging doctors 
to carefully weigh the risks in prescribing medications for 
arthritis and pain, suggesting limited use of Cox-2 
inhibitors.  (This includes Vioxx) 
 
Jan. 28, 2005 – ‘Event Three’  The US Court of Appeals in Washington rules that the 
company will lose its patent on the osteoporosis drug 
Fosamax by 2008 (initially set to expire in 2018).  This 
causes Merck’s stock to fall ten percent, as this is 
Merck’s second biggest seller, with sales of $3.2 billion 
in 2004. 
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Feb 18, 2005 – ‘Event Four’ The FDA releases an announcement saying they believe 
that the Cox-2 inhibitors’ benefits outweigh the increased 
chance of a cardiovascular event caused by the drugs. 
 
April 7, 2005 Pfizer removes Bextra from the market and changes the 
label of Celebrex after being told to do so from FDA. 
 
Aug. 19, 2005 Merck loses Ernst v Merck case.  Merck is found guilty 
by a jury in the death of Robert Ernst, a Texas man who 
took the pain killer Vioxx.  Robert Ernst’s widow is 
awarded $750,000 in damages, and an additional $24 
million for mental anguish and $229 million in punitive 
damages.36  Merck argues that Ernst died of clogged 
arteries, not a Vioxx-induced heart attack.  Merck plans 
to appeal.  They also begin to battle 4,200 other state and 
federal pending lawsuits. (first case)   
 
Nov. 3, 2005 Merck wins Humeston v Merck case.  Frederick 
Humeston from Boise, Idaho, claimed that his heart 
attack suffered on September 18, 2001 was a result of 
intermittent use of Vioxx over a two-month period.  
(second case)  On March 13, 2007 the jurors awarded $20 
                                                 
36
 Texas law limits the punitive damages to two million dollars if this case is upheld through the appeals 
process.  
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million in compensatory damages, then later said Merck 
should pay $27.5 million in punitive damages. 
 
Dec. 12, 2005 Mistrial declared in Irvan v Merck in a Houston Texas 
trial brought by Richard Irvan’s widow.  Just prior to his 
death in 2001, Irvin had been taking Vioxx for about a 
month for back pain.  As of Dec. 12, 2005, Merck is 
facing 7,000 cases over Vioxx.37  (third case, first federal 
case) 
 
Feb. 18, 2006 Merck wins Irvan v Merck case.  The New Orleans jury 
finds Merck wasn’t responsible for the previous Irvan 
case that was declared a mistrial in Houston December 
12, 2005.  (The original case was held in Houston, rather 
then New Orleans, due to hurricane damage.)  Evelyn 
Irvin Plunkett, widow of Richard ‘Dicky’ Irvin, alleges 
his May 2001 heart attack came after taking Vioxx for 
about a month.  (third case) 
 
                                                 
37
 One week before the mistrial, The New England Journal of Medicine claimed that Merck-sponsored 
scientists manipulated the cardiovascular data from a Vioxx study published in November 2000.  Editors of 
the journal accused the study’s authors of knowingly omitting the data from the publication’s final draft.  
Merck claims that the heart attacks in questions happened after the journal’s deadline for submission and 
were promptly reported to the FDA.  Federal Judge Eldon Fallon declared a mistrial of the case, stating that 
the jury had not been able to reach a verdict in a timely manner.  
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Apr. 5, 2006 Merck loses McDarby v Merck case, wins Cona v Merck 
case.  John McDarby was awarded damages of $4.5 
million, while Merck was absolved Merck in the case of 
Thomas Cona. (fourth and fifth cases) 
 
Apr 21, 2006 Merck loses Garza v Merck case.  A jury in Rio Grande 
City, Texas orders Merck to pay $32 million for the death 
of 71-year-old Leonel Garza.  On March 8th, 2007 the 
verdict stands with Merck to pay Garza $7.75 million.  
(sixth case) 
 
Jul. 13, 2006 Merck wins Doherty v Merck case.  The New Jersey jury 
ruled that Vioxx was not a substantial factor in Elaine 
Doherty’s death.  (seventh case) 
 
Aug. 2, 2006 Merck wins Grossberg v Merck case.  Stewart Grossberg 
took Vioxx before his heart attack at age 66, on 
September 18, 2001.  "We firmly believed that Vioxx 
was not the cause of this heart attack because the data do 
not support that infrequent, sporadic use of Vioxx 
contributes to heart attacks," said Thomas Yoo, a member 
of the defense team, in a statement. "At the end of the 
day, the fact remains that the plaintiff was at high risk for 
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a heart attack regardless of whether he was taking 
Vioxx."  (eighth case) 
 
Aug 17, 2006 Merck loses Barnett v Merck case,38 and Merck’s 
November win is thrown out.  Gerald Barnett was taking 
Vioxx for 33 moths prior to suffering his hear attack in 
September 2002 and two years afterwards.  He was 
awarded $51 million in damages, but the judge ruled that 
the jury’s verdict will stand, but the $51 million in 
compensatory damages were unreasonable.  The jury also 
found that Merck “knowingly misrepresented or failed to 
disclose” information about Vioxx to the doctors of the 
62-year-old, media reports.  The same day a New Jersey 
judge threw out Merck’s win from the November 
Humeston v Merck case. (ninth case) 
 
Sept 26, 2006 Merck wins Smith v Merck case.  A New Orleans jury 
found that Merck did not cause a 2003 hear attack of 
Robert Smith, 56.  Merck’s lead trial lawyer, Philip Beck, 
said “Unfortunately, Mr. Smith would have suffered a 
heart attack whether he was taking Vioxx or not.” (tenth 
case) 
                                                 
38
 Since this case the judge ruled that the jury’s verdict that Merck is liable in the case will stand, but the 
$51 million in compensatory damages were unreasonable. (8/31/06)  
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Dec 13, 2006 Merck wins Dedrick v Merck case.  “The [New Orleans] 
jury determined that Merck acted appropriately in the 
development and marketing of Vioxx, and that Vioxx did 
not substantially contribute to Mr. Dedrick's heart attack," 
said Merck's attorney, Phil Beck, of the Chicago law firm 
Bartlit Beck Herman Palenchar & Scott.  (eleventh case) 
Dec 16, 2006  Merck wins Albright v Merck case.  An Alabama state 
court jury said that the pain reliever didn't cause Gary 
Albright’s March 2001 heart attack.    Merck pointed out 
during the trial that he continued to take Vioxx until 
September 2004 when the company pulled it from the 
market.  Merck said Albright, now 58, had high blood 
pressure, diabetes and high cholesterol and was obese, all 
risk factors for heart disease.  (twelfth case) 
Jan 18, 2007 A mistrials declared on Appell v Merck and Arrigale v 
Merck.  Los Angeles judge declared two mistrials when 
the juries couldn’t come to a decision on the Scottsdale, 
AZ man, Lawrence Appell.  Appell suffered a heart 
attack in Dec of 2000 at the age of 51, which he blames 
on Vioxx.  He continued to take Vioxx until it was 
withdrawn in September 2004.  Rudolph Arrigale of 
Westminster, CA said he used the pain killer for four and 
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a half months before his heart attack in March, 2002 at 
the age of 72. 
 
Mar 2, 2007 Merck wins Hermans v. Merck, but loses Humeston v. 
Merck.  The Atlantic City jury split their ruling for the 
Merck cases.  The jury split the cases because they 
believed that Merck gave proper warning before 
Hermans’s Death (September 15, 2002, at age 44), but 
not before Humeston’s death, at age 61, one year earlier. 
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